OVERCOMING VIOLENT CONFLICT
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Volume I

PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT ANALYSIS IN WEST KALIMANTAN, CENTRAL KALIMANTAN AND MADURA

Rochman Achwan, Hari Nugroho and Dody Prayogo with Suprayoga Hadi
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Executive Summary

This report is a component of United Nations Development Programme’s Peace and Development Analysis in Indonesia project (PDA), implemented by UNDP Crisis Prevention and Recovery Unit (CPRU) in collaboration with key partners at national and sub-national levels. The PDA framework, developed by UNDP for use on the global level, is based on a highly consultative and participative methodology that takes into account the priorities defined by stakeholders, particularly the affected communities, to understand the overall conflict and development context and to serve as a basis for tailoring programme development strategies in conflict zones.

The conflicts in Kalimantan and the management of the internally displaced persons (IDP) situation, particularly in Madura (East Java province), have highlighted deficiencies in conflict early-warning systems, police and military response, humanitarian relief delivery and post-conflict management. Understanding the processes at work in Kalimantan and examining the lessons learned can also shed light on conflicts elsewhere in Indonesia. For these reasons, UNDP decided to expanded the PDA research process, which initially focused on three provinces where the UNDP has existing programmes (Maluku, North Maluku and Central Sulawesi) and to include Kalimantan and Madura and also Nusa Tenggara Timur. Secondary research and a media review were commissioned for Aceh and Papua.

This report analyses in detail the string of ethnic conflicts in West and Central Kalimantan provinces beginning in December 1996, and the subsequent situation of IDPs on the island of Madura in East Java province. It looks at both the causes and the impacts of the conflicts in the three areas and the situation on the ground up to May 2005.

Media reports of widespread violence, often including beheadings, cannibalism and ethnic cleansing, focused national and international attention on Kalimantan. In each case, a single ethnic group—migrants and descendants of migrants from the island of Madura—was targeted and accounted for the overwhelming majority of victims.

Desk reviews of the literature and field research in Kalimantan and Madura, carried out primarily by Labsosio of the University of Indonesia, demonstrate the importance of understanding the particular economic, political and social
contexts in the affected areas. This report traces the roots of the conflicts to central government policies dating back to the 1970s. The most notable of these were the numerous contracts, granted without any public bidding processes, to Jakarta-based logging, mining and plantation companies and the imposition of national laws that trumped the role of customary laws (adat), leading to disputes over land, natural resources, and conflict resolution.

The resulting fault lines led to grievances among local communities, particularly the indigenous Dayak populations in West and Central Kalimantan and Malays in West Kalimantan, grievances that would come to the fore in the era of increased political space and mobilisation of the late 1990s. In a dynamic witnessed elsewhere in Asia, Kalimantan's indigenous populations, marginalized by the policies of the central government, focused their growing resentment on migrants (in this case, the Madurese), who were seen to represent the state's monopoly over land and resources and its disregard for indigenous laws and prerogatives.

The first conflict occurred in 1996, a year before the fall of Soeharto at a time when ethno-nationalist sentiments ran high and indigenous populations increasingly aspired to local political control over territory. The promise and implementation of regional autonomy after the end of the New Order regime created space for a continuation of violent contestation.

The Madurese in West and Central Kalimantan were particularly hard hit by these conflicts. Most had to abandon their homes and livelihoods and seek shelter in safe areas in the Kalimantan or farther away in Madura. Recently, most IDPs from the 2001 Central Kalimantan conflict have begun returning, however IDPs from the West Kalimantan district of Sambas who fled during the 1999 conflict have been barred from returning to their homes. Tensions and economic competition between IDPs and the host communities led to violence in the capital of West Kalimantan in 2001. Some less serious problems have been reported in Madura due to the disbursement of aid to IDPs living in relatively poor Madurese villages and problems with social and occupational integration. Both victims and violent actors are psychologically scarred, yet few have received trauma counselling. In Kalimantan, locals and returnees note an increased reliance on physical intimidation during political campaigns and a general sense of insecurity.

Although years have passed since the conflicts erupted, resolution is still elusive for many people. The human and material cost of resettling over 100,000 IDPs in Madura, and the difficulty of securing their return under suitable conditions, raises questions about the wisdom of their removal from Kalimantan in the first place. Aid to IDPs in Kalimantan and elsewhere has represented a great burden for local and national budgets; how could its distribution been made more efficient or transparent? Perhaps the most fundamental question is: What could have been done to prevent the violence from spreading, from developing into ethnic cleansing, and from compelling the evacuation of so many people?

The report identifies several areas relevant to Peace-building and conflict mitigation in which developments should be monitored. First, the ongoing return of IDPs to Central Kalimantan should be assessed, particularly as it has been carried out without consistent government oversight. Second, the peace process in Sambas, West Kalimantan, should be re-launched to enable the return of IDPs, lest its failure provide an unwelcome precedent. Third, ongoing and future district elections in both provinces should be watched closely due to the increasing involvement of militia groups. Fourth, policy makers and analysts should be on the lookout for new horizontal inequalities, particularly between returning or resettled IDPs and others. Fifth, a number of other key issues should be monitored due to their potential to create tensions, such as the allocation of logging, plantation and mining concessions; illegal logging and mining; the creation of new districts, and the continuing debates on the role of adat law.
This report looks at the causes and impacts of conflict in the provinces of West and Central Kalimantan from 1996 to 2001, as well as the impact of those conflicts on the island of Madura following the influx of large numbers of internally displaced persons. The report also examines potential obstacles to a resolution of the conflicts and what might constitute building blocks for sustainable peace and equitable human development.

The provinces of West and Central Kalimantan, particularly the former, have recently been beset by large-scale violent incidents. The primary victims were ethnic Madurese, who had migrated to the region over the past 1

1.) According to one Dayak intellectual, deadly incidents of communal violence occurred in West Kalimantan every 2½ years during the New Order period. (Interview in Pontianak, 19 July 2004.) In Central Kalimantan, ethnic tensions have been reported since the early 1980s. However, the scale and virulence of the violence since 1996 surpassed anything that had come before.

2.) Madurese trace their origin to the island of Madura in East Java province, though many were born in Kalimantan and some have lost all connection to Madura. Sometimes referred to as Maduranese, we use the term Madurese from Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary.
several decades or earlier. Communal violence occurred in late December 1996 to mid-February 1997 (500 dead) and in January 1999 (more than 186 dead). Rioting again broke out in 2001, this time in Pontianak, targeting IDPs from the previous violence. At least 500 were killed and over 100,000 Madurese were forced to flee the island when violence flared in Central Kalimantan in 2001. More complete figures are presented in Section 4.

Taken as a whole, but mindful of their particularities, the Kalimantan conflicts provide an important set of case studies on the dynamics of ethnic conflict and interethnic relations in Indonesia. In less than 10 years, Kalimantan has experienced four serious rounds of sectarian violence and ethnic cleansing, each highlighting critical weaknesses in conflict early-warning systems, police and military response, humanitarian relief delivery and post-conflict management. There are many implications for local and regional governance, regional autonomy, economic development, natural resource management and human security.

2. Kalimantan Overview

2.1 West Kalimantan

The province of West Kalimantan shares a border with the Malaysian state of Sarawak to the north, and the provinces of Central and East Kalimantan to the east. The province comprises ten districts and two municipalities. The provincial capital, Pontianak, is located at the mouth of the Kapuas River. West Kalimantan is ethnically diverse. In 2000, West Kalimantan’s total population was 3,732,950. The population growth rate of 2.18 percent a year is much higher than the national average (1.37 percent). The 2000 national population census published by the National Statistics Agency (Biro Pusat Statistik, BPS) reported the total population of West Kalimantan as 4,016,000. The ethnic composition consisted of Malay Sambas (11.92 percent), Malays (7.50 percent), Chinese (9.46 percent), Japanese (9.14 percent), Dayak Kendayan (7.83 percent), Dayak Darat (7.50 percent), Madurese (5.46 percent) and others (31.12 percent). The Dayak elite community strongly protested the government’s report, arguing the agency simplified 10 Dayak subgroups into only two. Moreover, they criticised the high number of people classified as unidentified ‘others’. Malay elite, questioning the categorisation of Malay and Sambas, launched a similar protest. In 2003, the Provincial Statistics Agency published a revision of the 2000 provincial population census for West Kalimantan. The author uses this revised 2003 population census. For more information on this politics of numbers, see Kalimantan Review, Edisi Khusus Tahun XII, 2003.

3.) According to an estimate in the Human Rights Watch/Asia report, Indonesia: Communal Violence in West Kalimantan. HRW Vol. 9, No. 10(C), December 1997, http://www.hrw.org/reports/1997/wkali/ (accessed 10 July 2005). All but a few of the dead were Madurese. Other estimates range from 300 to 3,000.


5.) Ibid., ii. Madurese and Dayak estimates of the numbers killed are much higher.
ethnic composition of the population in 2000 was: West Kalimantan Malay 33.75 percent; Dayak 33.75 percent; Chinese 10.01 percent; Javanese 9.41 percent; Madurese 5.51 percent; Bugis 3.29 percent; Sundanese 1.21 percent; Malay Banjarese 0.66 percent; Batak 0.56 percent; and others 1.85 percent.

The Human Development Index of West Kalimantan is moderate (62.9 out of 100) compared with the national score of 66. It scores 30 on the Human Poverty Index, which is the highest ranking in Indonesia. West Kalimantan attracts little investment. In 2002, the Monitoring Committee for Regional Autonomy (Komisi Pelaksana Pemantauan Otonomi Daerah, KPPOD), a research institute run by the Indonesia Chambers of Commerce, reported that among the 134 districts in Indonesia, those in West Kalimantan score low on ‘investment attractiveness’ (Pontianak 86, Ketapang 110).

Economic activity in most districts of West Kalimantan is divided to a large extent along ethnic lines. In Ketapang and Landak, Malays often work in the civil service, while Dayaks tend to work in the agricultural sector. In urban areas, Madurese are employed mainly in the informal sector, while the Chinese community handles trading. The economies of Sambas and Pontianak are similarly based on ethnicity. In Sambas, most Malays work in agriculture and fishery, and Dayaks in agriculture. Before their expulsion from Sambas, some Madurese worked in the urban informal sector and others owned small farms in rural areas. In Pontianak, most Malays work in the urban informal sector where they compete against Madurese still remaining in the town following the 2001 riots. The Chinese enjoy a dominant position in the formal economy while Dayaks, relatively few in number, hold middle-level positions in the public sector.

2.2 Central Kalimantan

Central Kalimantan is the third largest province in Indonesia, covering 153,564 square kilometres, or 28 percent of the total land area of Kalimantan, and 8 percent of the total land area of the Indonesian archipelago. The province largely consists of areas of river plain, with some plateaus and hills in the north. With a population of 1,857,763 (as of the end of 2003), Central Kalimantan has a population density of only 12 people per square kilometre. The Dayaks, the indigenous and predominant ethnic group, consist of many sub-ethnic groups, each having its own language and traditions. Among these sub-ethnic groups are the Dayak Ngaju (including the Bakumpai and Mendawai), Ot Danum, Ma’anay, Lawangan and Siang. Other large ethnic communities in the province include Banjarese, Javanese, Madurese, Sundanese, Batak and Bugis. Administratively the province comprises 14 districts (13 kabupaten and 1 kota) with Palangka Raya serving as the provincial capital.

Most employment in Central Kalimantan is in agricultural production (including forest production). The unemployment rate is high, though other economic

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>1997</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>West Kalimantan</td>
<td>10,258,360</td>
<td>19,463,554</td>
<td>21,647,647</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Kalimantan</td>
<td>8,033,163</td>
<td>18,287,740</td>
<td>20,527,304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Kalimantan</td>
<td>27,243,444</td>
<td>86,242,138</td>
<td>88,782,881</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Kalimantan</td>
<td>6,008,107</td>
<td>12,318,241</td>
<td>13,804,818</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


8.) The rating of investment attractiveness is based on five factors broken down into 42 indicators. The five factors are: institutional development; social politics; regional economy; labour and productivity; and infrastructure. For more information, see Regional Autonomy Watch, Regional Investment Attractiveness: Rating of 134 Regencies/Cities in Indonesia & Problems of Business Environment, Jakarta, 109-110.
Structural Issues

The series of conflicts that broke out in West and Central Kalimantan from 1997 to 2001 had their roots in earlier central government policies. In the late 1970s, the central government began granting numerous contracts to Jakarta-based logging and plantation companies to exploit Kalimantan's lucrative timber resources. This exploitation by large national corporations caused grievances among local communities, particularly the indigenous Dayak population. These grievances came to the fore in the era of increased political space and mobilisation of the 1990s. The first in the series of conflicts occurred a year before the fall of Soeharto; heightened ethno-nationalist sentiment and aspirations for local political control over territory were present well before the implementation of regional autonomy.

3.1 Resource exploitation

Any assessment of the impact of local resources must begin by addressing the legal framework that defines the relationship between national and customary law.

as it developed under the administrations of Presidents Sukarno and Soeharto. Although their aim was to stimulate development, the 1960 Basic Agrarian Law, the 1967 Basic Forestry Law and the 1979 Village Government Law had the effect of removing barriers to the allocation of land traditionally held by Dayak and other local groups to national or Jakarta-based plantation, forestry and mining interests, and transmigration projects. The laws had far-reaching consequences for the economic, political and social life of the indigenous people, and led to the breakdown of adat governance.10

Article 5 of the 1960 Basic Agrarian Law No. 5 recognizes adat (customary) law, “as long as adat law does not conflict with national interests, as they are defined by the state”. Indigenous groups have argued that in a democratic state, all political and economic groups should have the opportunity to negotiate an equitable compromise on the issue of adat law rather than assume that national interests must come before adat interests.

Article 2 of the 1967 Basic Forestry Law No. 5 states that a state forest is any area of forest on land that is not owned. Dayak adat law, however, subjects all forest, regardless of ownership status, to adat law. Article 17 further stipulates that adat privileges “to obtain benefits from the forests” are only recognised so far as they “do not disturb the achievement of the purposes intended by the law.”

These two laws radically transformed the landscape of forested areas across Indonesia. Masiun (2000) states that by 1990, 575 logging concessions (Hak Pengusahaan Hutan, [area governed by] Forest Concession Law, HPH) operated in Indonesia on a total of some 60 million hectares of forest lands. Of these concessions, 301 operating in Kalimantan covered about 31 million hectares. Fully 70 percent of Kalimantan’s forested area is occupied by logging concessions. Seventy-five of Kalimantan’s 301 logging concessions operate in West Kalimantan, taking three-quarters of the total forested area and almost half of the total land area. Seven logging concessions in the district of Ketapang in West Kalimantan occupy 535,184 hectares of forest. Some 75,766 hectares of Dayak forest lands have been converted to plantations and 532,220 hectares in Ketapang were converted to transmigration sites.11

The central government considers the land to be state or unused land, for which the Dayak are ineligible for compensation. The Dayak consider it their traditional land. Few are mollified by the government promises of new jobs and infrastructures to result from industrial plantations or transmigration sites. Traditionally, the Dayak recognise both private property rights and communal property rights. Private property rights are inherited. Individuals mark off their property by planting hardwoods and fruit trees, erecting huts or shelters, or simply placing sticks on the periphery or at the corners. Boundaries between villages and their domains are similarly marked and respected. Lack of recent cultivation is not always a reliable sign of unused land, since slash-and-burn agriculturalists rotate between known cultivated and fallow plots over periods spanning many years. Land distant from Dayak villages may also be considered Dayak traditional land if used for hunting and gathering forest products. In recent years, Dayak associations have been involved in mapping the areas around villages to provide more tangible bases for defending land claims.

Dayaks resent the encroachment onto their traditional forest lands. Dayaks accuse the logging and plantation companies of ignoring environmental protection statutes and sustainable forestry practices, and also of disregarding traditional Dayak property rights. Rapid forest degradation due to actions by concession holders who were often linked to the military naturally became a concern for the Dayaks.


11.) Ibid., 65.
particularly those whose livelihoods continued to depend on the collection of forest products. In the mid-1970s, 84 percent of Central Kalimantan was classified as forest. By 1999 the percentage had declined to 66.9 percent. Since then, fires and illegal logging have further reduced the forested area.

The Dayak sense of alienation was further exacerbated when the national government promulgated the 1979 Village Government Law No. 5. This law decreed a uniform government structure for all Indonesia villages. The village head became a political figure, accountable to the subdistrict head rather than to villagers. Virtually overnight, structures of Dayak governance in place for centuries became obsolete. The role and position of the *tumenggung*—*adat* community leaders responsible for overseeing social, economic and political development—broke down and their functions were taken over by village heads appointed by the district government. Likewise, Dayak courts that managed conflicts at the local level became defunct, notably in the districts of Landak and Sambas in West Kalimantan where serious conflicts would later erupt.

At the same time, the boom in the logging industry forced the forest-dwelling Dayaks to either move or to adopt new lifestyles alien to their culture. The national government attempted to assimilate the Dayaks by encouraging them to move from their longhouses in remote rainforests into standardised ‘Indonesian’ villages. Similar programs were undertaken by the Soeharto regime throughout Indonesia to move dispersed and isolated settlements to tidy roadside communities where they could receive government services, and also where the government could exercise more economic and social control. This reconfiguration of the traditional Dayak village structure was to have a lasting impact on the *adat* system of government, disrupting local forms of authority and social order and dislocating entire communal groups.

The forest Dayaks were not the only people to experience pressures from big business. J. S. Davidson states that the entry of new fishermen from outside the province, backed by wealthy businessmen and equipped with modern fishing boats and gear, displaced the traditional Malay fishermen. By creating monopolies in the citrus (*jeruk*) industry, the business dealings of Soeharto’s children created grievances, eventually driving many local mandarin growers out of business. Demographic and economic pressures prompted many Malays to seek jobs illegally in Malaysia. Most of these illegal workers were subsequently expelled by the Malaysian government and returned to Sambas. In conclusion, both the Dayaks and the Malays have suffered marginalisation due to the misguided or even monopolistic policies crafted in the capital.

During the New Order, Kalimantan was a magnet for both government-organised and spontaneous migrants. As one of the government’s main relocation areas, the transmigration programme came into full swing in the late 1960s and as a result major shifts in population occurred. The schemes inevitably took over what indigenous populations considered their ancestral lands. From 1986 to 2002 West Kalimantan received 97,793 heads of households or 407,047 transmigrants from Java. Extensive citrus plantations and other new concession industries absorbed large numbers of spontaneous migrants. According to the Central Statistics Agency (BPS), by the late 1990s approximately one quarter of the population of Central Kalimantan was non-local in origin.

Although transmigrants came from many parts of the archipelago, the Madurese were highly visible. Unlike the more numerous Javanese, they tended to leave transmigration settlements to work on plantations and in the logging industry, occupying the same land and employment niches of the Dayaks. They opened unforested areas and established communities along new roads.
that made the interior of the province more accessible, especially for logging companies, plantation developments and migrant settlements. To many Dayaks it appeared that government policies on land, forest management and economic activities favoured the Madurese at their expense. Where Dayaks felt marginalised, they saw Madurese appearing to benefit.

Madurese were also drawn to urban occupations in markets, land and river transportation, petty commerce and in the ports. Dayaks claim that, in places such as Sampit in Central Kalimantan, the dominance of Madurese in low-level sectors of the economy shut them out of employment opportunities.

Although the percentage of Madurese was small, in some areas their population grew rapidly over a short period of time. In Sambas, for instance, 10,000 Madurese arrived between 1996 and 1998. This was an important influx in a district where Madurese represented less than 10 percent of the population. Before the conflict, the district was composed of 47 percent Malays, 28 percent Dayaks, 11 percent Chinese, 9.4 percent Madurese, and others made up the remaining 4.6 percent. The Malays in particular felt increased competition from the newcomers in the urban informal sector, and over control of illegal businesses.

Dayaks and Malays tend to stereotype Madurese as ‘exclusive’. West Kalimantan locals see a high degree of segregation, even among Muslim Dayaks, Malays and Madurese, since Madurese tend to attend their own mosques and carry out other religious activities within their own communities. In Central Kalimantan, Dayaks also pin the exclusive label on the Madurese, accusing them of setting up economic monopolies, living in separate neighbourhoods and separate cultural and religious spheres, particularly in Sampit.

In virtually every explanation offered for the violence that eventually engulfed the two provinces and was so costly in terms of lives and livelihoods (especially for the Madurese), Dayaks (and to some extent members of other ethnic groups) point to the Madurese themselves, characterising them as exclusive, violence-prone, aggressive and intolerant. Dayak leaders have long accused Madurese of disregarding local culture and previous peace accords. They claim that Madurese are frequently connected to thugs (preman) who commit crimes and then buy off the police or receive protection from their ethnic organisations. Indeed, as the economic prosperity of the Madurese increased, they could well have gained some influence over a corrupt local security apparatus, thus compromising law enforcement. Some Dayaks and Malays (and even some Madurese) distinguish between older, well-integrated and well-regarded migrants who came from Madura many decades ago and troublesome recent migrants.

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14.) Ibid., 55.
15.) This common perception emerged from focus group discussions in Sampit and Palangka Raya.
17.) Madurese dispute this claim. They say most Dayaks were uninterested in doing the work the Madurese did such as manual labour, transport and market trading.
19.) While many Dayaks are Christian or embrace local indigenous beliefs, all Madurese are Muslim. The Madurese have built many mosques, pesantren (Islamic secondary boarding schools) and madrasah (Islamic primary day schools). In neither province, however, has religion appeared to play a key role in the conflicts. 20.) Interviews in Sampit, Palangka Raya and Kapuas in 2003 and 2004. Similar opinions were also expressed by other migrants such as Javanese and Batak. Madurese are reputed to frequently engage in revenge attacks, called carok in Madurese. Nonetheless, the violent crime rate in Madura is comparable to rates throughout Indonesia. Historical factors—most notably the Dutch colonial power’s use of Madurese auxiliaries to quell dissent on other islands—go a long way to explaining the deep-seated perceptions Dayak, Javanese and other Indonesians have of the Madurese. See Glenn Smith, ‘Carok Violence in Madura: From Historical Conditions to Contemporary Manifestations.’ Folk – Journal of the Danish Ethnographic Society 39, 1997, 57-75; Smith, op. cit., ‘Violence in Madura: The Interplay of Resource, Culture, and History’ in Myrdene Anderson, ed., Cultural Shaping of Violence: Victimization, Escalation, Response (West Lafayette, Indiana: Purdue University Press), 207-213.
21.) Though admitting that a small minority of Madurese were involved in criminal activities, one IDP group in Sumenep District, Madura, said that, prior to the violence, there was a general consensus in Central Kalimantan that Banjarese, Dayaks and Javanese were more likely to be involved in criminal activities than were Madurese. Madurese leaders claim they consistently called on the police to capture and punish lawbreakers, from whatever group, because they feared being drawn into wider conflicts.
22.) IDPs in Madura considered those who migrated to Kalimantan before 1960 as belonging to the older group.
Most Madurese reject these characterisations out of hand. They deny the charge of exclusivity, maintaining that their communities were never closed, and intermarriage with Dayaks and other groups was frequent, and relations with their Dayak neighbours were cordial. Madurese IDP community leaders do not hesitate to accuse the Dayaks of planning the violence well in advance in order to push the Madurese off their land and to take over their businesses, cleverly orchestrating a smear campaign to obscure the Dayak actions and ‘blame the victims.’ The Madurese also have their stereotypes of the Dayak, as indolent, given to alcohol abuse and quick to ask for money or pick a fight.

It is interesting to note that when Dayaks or Madurese were asked to describe the other group, they would invariably begin by evoking the stereotypical images, but when pressed to detail their own personal and neighbourhood interactions with specific individuals, totally different pictures emerged. One after another explained that they themselves had nothing but friendly relations with their Madurese/Dayak neighbours. The evil came from elsewhere. “It was the Dayak outsiders or provocateurs who were out to get us,” say the Madurese. “The problem was with Madurese thugs and tycoons who were planning a power play,” say the Dayaks. But the vast majority of ordinary Madurese and Dayaks seem to have had little direct contact with these evil individuals.

3.2 Proximate Causes and Dynamics

3.2.1 West Kalimantan

1996-1997

Whatever the relations between ordinary Dayak and migrant communities before the first major clash in 1996 and 1997 in West Kalimantan, there was a growing movement by Dayak leaders to press certain grievances and mobilise on the issues of Dayak social and economic marginalization. This grievance led to increased mobilisation among Dayaks in the province. The most important vehicle for Dayak mobilisation was the Yayasan Karya Sosial Pancur Kasih (Shower of Love Institute for Social Work) based in Pontianak. Pancur Kasih (Shower of Love) or PK was established in 1981 to promote educational programs in junior and high schools, but subsequently expanded to bring together urban middle-class Dayaks in order to develop better conditions for the Dayak community through solidarity, self-reliance and a strong cultural base. PK was involved in the mobilisation and politico-legal education of rural Dayaks and developed extensive networks among other Dayak NGOs. PK successfully established credit unions to support economic empowerment of poor Dayaks in the cities and rural areas, and established the Institut Dayakology to carry out research into the social and cultural life of the Dayaks.

PK also formed Lembaga Bela Banua Talino (LBBT, Bela Banua Talino Institute) to train rural Dayak in mapping traditional (adat) forestlands occupied by logging and plantation companies. LBBT organised forums and mobilised Dayak protests against unfavourable laws regarding resource exploitation. PK lobbied the government, military officials, adat councils and the companies involved in natural resource extraction themselves to obtain support for the demonstrators.

In the late 1990s rural Dayaks turned their attention to natural resource companies and local governments in actions that sometimes turned violent. Dayaks demanded the reinstatement of adat law in the management of natural resources and an end to criminal activities. Public demonstrations and sabotage (blocking roads or destroying

23.) To demonstrate their integration in Kalimantan, Madurese IDPs often remark that when they fled to the island of Madura many had no family to return to or were unable to communicate in the Madurese language.
25.) Interviews with IDPs in Surabaya and the four districts of Madura (2003 and 2005).
26.) Many Madurese IDPs were given shelter or safe passage by Dayak neighbours and friends. Some received early warnings by phone of imminent attacks.

early February, Dayaks passed the ‘red bowl’ from village to village as a ritual declaration of war against the Madurese. A bowl containing the blood and remains of a chicken was carried from one village to the next to rally fighters to a common cause. Ritual specialists administered potions and provided amulets thought to render one invincible, and ancient traditions of headhunting and cannibalism were revived as a way of building warriors’ confidence and solidarity while instilling fear in their enemies. The revival of these ancient practices marked an important escalation in the conflict, and provided a pattern that would be repeated in future conflicts in West and Central Kalimantan.

In the same week, Dayaks marched to an army barracks to capture Madurese who had fled there for protection. The soldiers shot into the crowd, killing seen Dayaks. Violence intensified and spread to the districts of Pontianak and Sanggau.

By the time the violence subsided in April 1997, between 500 and 1,700 people had been killed, the ast majority Madurese. Places of worship were left relatively untouched.

The 1999 violence in Sambas district, West Kalimantan, started between Malays and Madurese. Dayaks soon joined the fray, attacking Madurese in a devastating example of ethnic cleansing. To some extent, the 1999 violence was connected to the causes and outcome of the 1997 conflict, notably the Dayak political resurgence that resulted from their success against the Madurese. As anti-Madurese sentiment rose among Malays, so did a newfound sense of Malay-ness. A key element to the conflict was a burgeoning competition for economic and political control of the northwest part of the province, essentially between Malays and Dayaks. Madurese, in one sense, were caught in the middle. The pattern of violence was to borrow much from the previous episode in Ledo in 1996 and 1997.

As Dayaks continued to mobilise following the 1997 violence, Malays in Pontianak and Sambas also formed

The security apparatus was seen to be slow to respond, and in many cases crimes remained unsolved, particularly (at least from the point of view of many Dayaks) when Madurese were involved. Dayaks charged that the security apparatus protected Madurese criminals.

Against this background, a relatively minor incident triggered rioting between Dayaks and Madurese. On 30 December 1996 in the area of Sanggau Ledo, 270 kilometres north-east of Pontianak, a fight broke out at a music concert when a group of Madurese injured two Dayaks as retribution for an altercation over a girl at a music concert several weeks earlier. The two Dayaks were treated and discharged from the hospital, but rumours spread that they had been killed. A crowd of Dayaks marched to the police station demanding retribution for the injured Dayaks. The police denied having made any arrests; in fact they had already taken the two Madurese into custody. In the days following, Dayaks marched on the town, burning hundreds of Madurese houses and market stalls and destroying crops in the fields. In two weeks, the toll was an estimated 20 Madurese dead and 1,000 homes destroyed.

Madurese retaliated by burning down Dayak homes and the offices of a well-known Dayak NGO in Pontianak. In


29) District of Landak, previously part of district of Pontianak, was one of the main areas affected by the violence.

30) Davidson, op. cit., 71.
their own ethnic associations to protect Malay interests. The Malay Cultural and Customary Council (Majelis Adat dan Budaya Melayu, MABM) argued against the application of Dayak claims to certain tracts of land. Malay mobilisation was also given political impetus following the decision in late 1998 to divide the district of Sambas into two districts, Bengkayang and coastal Sambas. Dayak political control of Bengkayang was largely unchallenged, but according to Davidson, Malays faced one major challenge in their goal of controlling coastal Sambas. In Sambas, Madurese controlled most illegal rackets such as gambling and extortion. Davidson argues that the Malay elite sought control of this network. Madurese also controlled the informal sector in areas such as transport.

The police, meanwhile, were perceived as being either incapable or unwilling to deal with a rising crime rate, especially burglaries. As a result, people living in housing complexes activated the so-called Siskamling (Sistem Pengamanan Lingkungan, neighbourhood policing groups). Many ordinary Malays (and Dayaks) perceived the Madurese as aggressive and violent, and suspected they were behind many of the crimes. Although in theory the Siskamling could have played a positive role in securing neighbourhoods, in reality they singled out the Madurese, accusing them of being responsible for the high rates of crime.

The 1999 anti-Madurese violence began with relatively minor incidents in January. Malays beat a young Madurese man who had apparently stolen a motorbike. The following day, the day of Muslim Forgiveness, a Madurese preman (thug) leader and the mother of the man who had been beaten led an attack on a Malay village. Hundreds of Madurese, transported in three trucks, killed three and wounded an unknown number of Malays during this ‘operation of freedom’. Malays waited in vain for local police to take action against the Madurese involved in the deaths. Police inaction only served to increase suspicion that the Madurese were paying them off. In the month following, just like the Dayak NGOs prior to the 1996-1997 violence, the Malays formed the Sambas-based Communication Forum of Malay Youth (Forum Komunikasi Pemuda Melayu, FKPM), an organisation largely run by thugs. For weeks, FKPM discussed strategies for solving ‘the Madurese question’ and formed Malay neighbourhood militias.

In late February 1999, a Madurese passenger stabbed a Malay bus conductor in Sambas, triggering renewed violence between youths from each community. The violence escaladed dramatically when a Dayak was killed in March, bringing the Dayaks in on the side of the Malays, and large-scale ethnic cleansing ensued. Together, Dayaks and Malays attacked Madurese communities throughout Sambas district. Most Madurese fled to Pontianak, while others fled directly to Madura and East Java.

In Central Kalimantan in the mid 1990s there also appears to have been a strong resurgence of Dayak ethno-nationalist identity. A primary goal of the elite leading the movement was a greater political and economic role for Dayaks in the province. They believed Dayaks should hold the governorship and district head positions, and should be better represented in the bureaucracy.

As in West Kalimantan, a primary vehicle for this resurgence in Central Kalimantan was an ethnic association. In Central Kalimantan the primary ethnic association was Dayak; the Central Kalimantan Representative Association (Lembaga Musyawarah Masyarakat Dayak dan Daerah Kalimantan Tengah, LMMDD-KT). LMMDD-KT was formed in 1993 to achieve the goal of greater Dayak political and bureaucratic representation.

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31.) Ibid., 85.
32.) Much of this description draws on Davidson, ibid., 84-85.
33.) This discussion is taken from fieldwork done by the team in West Kalimantan and also from Davidson, ibid., 78-79.
34.) Much of this political background is based on G. Van Klinken, ‘Indonesia’s new ethnic elites’ (Central and East Kalimantan), in Indonesia: In Search of Transition, Henk Schutte Nordholt and Irwan Abdullah eds. (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 2002), 67-105.
During the New Order, LMMDD-KT focused on revitalizing Dayak identity and obtaining positions in the bureaucracy. In December 1998, LMMDD-KT Congress concluded that “Dayaks [were] to become masters in their own country” as the “sons of the soil” of Kalimantan.

As the social distance between Dayaks, Malays and Madurese increased, Madurese increased their own ethnic solidarity. Madurese mobilisation was primarily organized in Central Kalimantan by a group called the Madurese Family Association of Central Kalimantan (Ikatan Keluarga Madura Kalteng, IKAMA). Besides functioning as a voluntary social organisation, IKAMA was thought to be a criminal organisation, involved in bribing the security apparatus. 35

As elsewhere in Indonesia, decentralisation led to a rise in competition among members of the elite for important political positions such as provincial governor and district head. In Central Kalimantan the Dayak political elite recognised the political potential of decentralisation. LMMDD-KT was deeply involved in election campaigns after the onset of Reformasi. This elite-level mobilisation appears to have interacted with growing inter-communal tension at the grassroots level. In the 1990s many Madurese had not only settled in Sampit, but also along a new highway36 that stretched from Palangka Raya through Sampit to Pangkalanbun.

35.) According to most accounts of the 2001 conflict, IKAMA mobilised Madurese to fight. When the Madurese were ‘defeated’, Dayaks frequently targeted IKAMA activists during the ensuing massacre conducted by the Dayaks. In an interview in Surakarta in November 2001, the leader of IKAMA, the late Haji Marlinggi, denied that IKAMA played any part in mobilising Madurese for defensive or offensive actions. He claimed that he gave the police IDR 8 million (US$ 825 at current rate) of his own money so they could go to Madura to try to track down the authors of the Sendung killing. Marlinggi served as head of an interethnic conflict early warning apparatus that was not fully operational at the time of the Sampit outbreak. Another wealthy Madurese often accused by Dayaks of bankrolling fighters during the Sampit conflict gave a similar story. He said he would never have gambled on such a losing proposition, and was targeted simply because he had a thriving sawmill and other businesses that could be seized.

36.) The highway was built primarily using Madurese labourers.

Several small riots occurred in rural areas late 2000 involving Madurese and Dayak workers working in the construction, mining and timber industries. 37 The first incident took place in the gold-rush shantytown of Tumbang Samba in September 1999. In this incident, a Madurese migrant is reported to have stabbed a Dayak man and his wife. In a second incident in July 2000, a fight broke out between Malay labourers and a group of Madurese men who were said to have been supporters of a local timber trader. The fighting escalated and spread to Pangkalanbun’s port town of Kumai. The next incident is considered to be the real spark of the subsequent widespread inter-ethnic violence. In Kereng Pangi (another gold-rush town located halfway between Sampit and Palangka Raya) in December 2000, three Madurese men stabbed a Dayak named Sendung at a karaoke bar and brothel. Sendung has been characterised as a Dayak activist, a participant in earlier violent incidents, or a known troublemaker. This incident was followed by the murder of several Madurese, as well as the destruction of Madurese-owned bars and houses. As a direct result of this outbreak of violence, thousands of Madurese fled into the surrounding jungle or sought protection from the local police. Local police failed to protect the Madurese from Dayak attacks and to capture the three Madurese men accused of the murder of Sendung. Following the death of Sendung, several LMMDD-KT leaders warned that tensions could overflow into wider violence if measures were not taken to arrest the killers and put a halt to what they claimed was a Madurese power play in the province.

Tensions ran high among Madurese in Sampit, where Madurese were in the majority. Five days after the murder of Sendung, an explosion in a Madurese house in Sampit killed two and seriously burned four others in an adjacent dwelling. Dayaks saw this as evidence for rumours that had been circulating that the Madurese were stockpiling bombs, although the police chief in Palangka Raya quickly announced that according to preliminary investigations

Accounts differ as to the events that followed. The Dayak accounts usually claim the Madurese had the run of the town and were attacking Dayaks. The Madurese version speaks of interethnic neighbourhood watches, a decision to halt all violence, and the disarming of all Madurese in the town. The chronologies in the two versions diverge and it would be difficult to come to a definitive version of the events.

What is clear, however, is that by 20 February, just two days after the killing of the Madurese family, thousands of Dayak began to pour into the city by river and road. Up to 10,000 Madurese fled into the surrounding forests, and 23,000 sought refuge at the district head's office and in the police headquarters.

The murder of Madurese, and the torching of their homes began in earnest in the town, then quickly spread to the villages and countryside around Sampit and beyond. The following Sunday, the provincial capital of Palangka Raya was the scene of house burnings. By March almost all Madurese from the areas around Sampit and Palangka Raya had been evacuated, and in April the violence spread to Pangkalanbun. Over 100,000 Madurese were transported to camps and villages on the island of Madura and elsewhere in East Java. By early March, the official death toll in the province had reached 469, of which 456 were Madurese.

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40.) The IKAMA leader, Haji Marlinggi, said that he went to the scene to try to calm down the Madurese outside the house. When his exhortations were ignored, he told the police to shoot any Madurese who interfered. Police fired shots and one report has it that a Dayak was killed by the Madurese when he fell from one of the police trucks.

41.) Based on the account in International Crisis Group, Lessons from Kalimantan, op. cit., 6-7.


43.) Dayak, Javanese and Madurese informants say the Dayak warriors (pasukan) were recruited in the upper river districts of Central Kalimantan and from West Kalimantan, organized and sent to Sampit. They were still manning barricades on access roads in 2002. Some returned to their villages and others joined local militias. From interviews in Kalimantan in 2002 and Madura in 2003.


45.) Tempo, 11 March 2001, 21; see also International Crisis Group, ibid.
Several violent incidents occurred in 2000 and 2001 in the West Kalimantan capital of Pontianak, starting with the burning of the local parliament building by a Dayak mob in protest of candidates chosen to represent West Kalimantan at the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR) in Jakarta. The Dayaks were challenged by groups of thugs, recruited by politicians from criminal gangs.  

In early 2000, Dayaks again mobilised in response to rumours that Chinese traders were planning to close their shops and stop selling commodities. The Dayak community perhaps felt this could disrupt Dayak trading links with the Chinese. Intervention by both the police and the Dayak elite prevented the situation from turning violent. Later that year the Dayak community in Pontianak held a series of demonstrations in opposition to a gubernatorial candidate who had allied himself with the Malays. (He was later elected).

Pontianak was chosen as a primary site for resettlement camps for the Madurese IDPs who had fled Sambas following the 1999 ethnic conflict there. An estimated 68,934 IDPs had to live in unsanitary conditions, and without electricity, health or educational facilities. Another 10,000 fled to Madura and other parts of East Java. The security of IDPs was not assured, and local communities attacked them in November 2000 and periodically throughout 2001. The most serious riot in 2001 was touched off following Malay opposition to the provincial government’s plan to permanently settle the IDPs in the Pontianak area. On 23 June 2001, two Malays who had shut their food stalls (warung) outside the refugee camp were stopped on their way home by four unknown Madurese youths. Two Malay youth associations, PFKPM and PERMAK, mobilised the masses and violence spread.

Cross-cutting Analysis of Kalimantan Conflicts

A number of explanations have been advanced to explain the violent conflicts that have plagued Kalimantan since 1996. Some have been taken by the allures of conspiracy theories. One informant said many people in West Kalimantan believed the family and persons close to Soeharto had engineered the conflicts there to hide corrupt business dealings and trafficking along the Malaysia-Kalimantan border. One prominent observer was convinced he could identify intelligence operatives among provocateurs. Some believe that Dayak elites are

46.) Davidson, op. cit.
48.) Davidson, op. cit.
49.) Focus group interviews with Madurese leaders in Pontianak, 22 July 2004.
entertaining long-term hopes of building a Dayak state, and to that end are seeking to control territory and train fighters through limited ethnic confrontations. Proof to back up any of these theories is generally lacking, even if some cannot be discounted entirely without further study.

Less controversial are the insights that can be gained by comparing the violent episodes in West and Central Kalimantan (see Table 2, Cross-tabulation of the five main Kalimantan conflicts). This comparison demonstrates that later violence cannot be understood without reference to precursor incidents, and that the push to control territory and the concomitant political and economic spoils—while not necessarily with separatist intent—can be a powerful determinant of when violent action will occur.

Two points are worth elaborating here. First, the early riots in Sanggau Ledo in 1996 and 1997 set the stage for the 1999 and 2001 violence in Sambas and Pontianak, providing a model that could be exported. Sanggau Ledo demonstrated to all that the Dayaks were prepared to go to war to punish and expel any minority group showing disrespect for their prerogatives in what they considered to be their traditional territories. For the Malays, Sambas was their opportunity to demonstrate they were as prepared as the Dayaks to stake a more definite claim of ownership of their district. The Sambas violence in 1999, which led to the expulsion of all Madurese from the district, in turn provided a model for the 2001 violence in Sampit, which led to the expulsion of virtually all Madurese from Central Kalimantan. One exception was the district of Pangkalanbun city, where the elites and security forces took decisive action to secure the town. That an ethnic group could be expelled from Sambas with no hope of return and no restitution for losses incurred (at least as of 2005) is a dangerous precedent.

Second, since the violence began in Sanggau Ledo in December 1996, the fall of the New Order government (1998) and the decentralisation laws (drafted in 1999) appear to have had less influence on the Kalimantan conflicts than they had in other parts of Indonesia. Nevertheless, the struggle with the state and with other ethnic groups for control of territory and resources is central to all of the conflicts. Ethnic politics definitely played roles in setting the stage for both Sambas and Sampit. Communications were also used, both before and after the conflicts. In all of the conflicts, great efforts were marshalled by those expelling outsiders to justify their actions as defensive and reactive rather than offensive and proactive. While Madurese IDPs were still hiding in the forests or settling into their camps, Dayak intellectuals and leaders were presenting their case to journalists and academics and posting messages on dozens of internet discussion lists.

Most Dayak and Malay elites—in private at least—express satisfaction at the results obtained from the conflicts. Dayaks made great gains economically and politically, and Malays have asserted control over the Sambas district and have started to revitalize the Sambas sultanate. According to at least one analyst, the Malays were in danger of being marginalised by the resurgent Dayaks following their expulsion of the Madurese. Paintings are now hung in the Sultan’s palace in Sambas to document the Malay victory. After the Sampit conflict, some went as far as to say that Sampit was the most ‘successful’ of all the conflicts because the Dayaks were able to remove all the Madurese from Central Kalimantan (unlike in Sambas or Sanggau Ledo where the Madurese are still in West Kalimantan).

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51.) Due to their extensive contacts with national and international NGOs, the Dayaks were vastly better equipped than the Madurese and could quickly transmit their version of events to a wide audience. See Smith, op. cit., ‘The Violence in Central Kalimantan’.

52.) According to Davidson, the real conflict was between the Dayak and the Malays, but each group could see its purposes served by attacking a vulnerable third party, in this case the Madurese. Davidson, op. cit. 83-87.

53.) Although subsequently many Madurese began returning to Central Kalimantan.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Incident</th>
<th>Official death toll</th>
<th>Structural background to conflict</th>
<th>Proximate causes</th>
<th>Trigger incident</th>
<th>Escalation</th>
<th>Evidence of planning</th>
<th>Results</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sanggau Ledo 1996-1997</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>History of Dayak economic and political marginalisation, emerging ethno-nationalism</td>
<td>Dayaks increasingly identify Madurese with crime and ills of development</td>
<td>Injury of two Dayak youths by Madurese boys in revenge for a previous altercation</td>
<td>Dayaks attack Madurese settlements, Madurese attack Dayak NGO and homes; Dayaks declare total war</td>
<td>Early stages relatively spontaneous. During escalation stage recruitment and attacks are organised</td>
<td>Madurese expelled from Bengkayang and assets destroyed or seized</td>
<td>Firearms used in fighting. Rumours help mobilise masses. As of 2002, Madurese are afforded limited possibilities to return to harvest crops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sambas 1999</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>Emerging Malay ethno-nationalism, need to assert Malay prerogatives in regional autonomy following Dayak resurgence after expulsion of Madurese</td>
<td>Tension between Malay and Madurese youths, and between thugs for control of illicit businesses</td>
<td>Malays beat up Madurese for assumed breaking and entry; Madurese retaliate by attacking Malay village (3 dead)</td>
<td>Malay form neighbourhood militias that respond en masse to next incident; killing of a Dayak leads Dayaks to side with Malays</td>
<td>Planning and arming occurred after trigger incident; widespread use of firearms</td>
<td>Madurese flee, assets destroyed or seized; Malay political resurgence meets Dayak threat</td>
<td>Return of Madurese impossible in foreseeable future</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pontianak 2001</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Run-up to DPR and gubernatorial elections; Dayaks stage mass, sometimes violent, demonstrations</td>
<td>Tension between Malay and Madurese traders Proximate causes</td>
<td>Incident between traders escalated by Malay association mobilization</td>
<td>Malays and Dayaks give ultimatum to Madurese to leave camps; camps set on fire</td>
<td>Desire to rid Pontianak of IDPs was long-standing; escalation stage, camp torching planned Evidence of planning</td>
<td>Madurese lost positions in transport to Chinese and Malays; market stalls to Malays</td>
<td>Economic position of Madurese severely affected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kereng Pangi 2000</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>History of Dayak History of Dayak marginalisation, emerging ethno-nationalism illegal mining and logging within and on periphery of concessions</td>
<td>Low-yield illegal mining by individuals repressed; atmosphere of impoverished miners in shanty towns + alcohol + vice</td>
<td>Sendung, a high-profile Dayak, killed by 3 Madurese in karaoke-brothel complex. Police fail to catch attackers or prevent escalation</td>
<td>Almost instant reaction from Dayaks: mass torching of Madurese homes and businesses</td>
<td>Trigger planning unclear; escalation probably organised</td>
<td>Madurese expelled from town, homes and businesses. Some went to Palangka Raya, some returned to Madura</td>
<td>Escalation to Sampit violence two months later may have been programmed as Dayak leader stated in Kereng Pangi that more violence would come if Madurese responsible for killing Sendung were not apprehended (they were not)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sampit 2001</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>New regional autonomy scheme raises political and economic stakes and risks; heightened tension as Dayaks claim Madurese want to control province, seek revenge for Kereng Pangi (Madurese deny)</td>
<td>No Dayaks receive political appointments in district reorganisation</td>
<td>On eve of installing new officials, Dayak warriors kill Madurese family of 5 in their sleep in Baamang- Sampit</td>
<td>Madurese attack a few Dayak houses; thousands of Dayak warriors respond, attacking Sampit and elsewhere in the province</td>
<td>Trigger and escalation appear to have been planned; apparent killers and paymasters apprehended but released due to Dayak outcry</td>
<td>Madurese expelled from most of province, assets destroyed or seized. Anti-migrant laws passed</td>
<td>Some Madurese return before 2004 (~7000), about 80 percent have returned as of June 2005. Most others still in Madura and East Java plan to return. Some areas in Central Kalimantan still off limits to Madurese</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by Glenn Smith
4. Impacts of Conflict

4.1 Human Suffering

4.1.1 West Kalimantan

The violence in West and Central Kalimantan from 1996 to 2001 resulted in hundreds of deaths and immense human suffering, particularly among Madurese communities residing in the two provinces. During the violence in Bengkayang and adjoining districts in West Kalimantan in 1997, between 500 and 1,700 died; thousands of homes and businesses were destroyed. The violence in Sambas in 1999 took the lives of approximately 200 to 500 Madurese; thousands of homes, livestock and orchard trees were destroyed. The anti-IDP riot in Pontianak in 2001 took fewer lives (less than 10 Madurese died), but carried an important political message. Identity politics had finally reached the capital city and heart of West Kalimantan.

54 Peluso and Harwell, op. cit., 84.
The 1996-1997 violence displaced some 25,000 Madurese from West Kalimantan, many airlifted by the military to neighbouring districts. Some local people occupied, appropriated and even purchased Madurese lands. In some areas, Madurese families were subsequently able to return and begin to rebuild their destroyed houses with grants provided by the local government. Two years later they were expelled again following the violence in Sambas. In Bengkayang, the Madurese were allowed to return during the day to work their fields, but were not allowed to stay overnight. 56

The 1999 violence in the district of Sambas, West Kalimantan and surrounding areas forced more than 70,000 Madurese to flee southward. According to the provincial office of Transmigrasi and PPH, 57 the total number of Madurese IDPs between January and April 1999 was 12,472 head of households or 68,934 people. They lived in 26 camps spread over the districts of Sambas 58 and Pontianak and the municipality of Pontianak.59 The governor made a quick decision to register and secure Madurese properties in order to prevent the illegal occupation of Madurese land. 60

For Central Kalimantan, ICG reported 469 deaths of which 456 were Madurese. 61 Besides the high death toll, the 2001 conflict in Central Kalimantan was marked by large-scale displacement. During the conflict, as many as 200,000 Madurese were evacuated from Central Kalimantan.62 Of this number approximately 70,000 to 80,000 came from Kotawaringin Timur District in February 2001.

### Economic Impacts

The economic impact of these violent conflicts has been very costly to West Kalimantan. 63 At the peak of the conflict in 1999, the province's annual economic growth fell to 0.49 percent. Although by 2002 it had recovered to 3.51 percent, official unemployment remained high at 7.3 percent. The province dropped from 13th to 16th place nationally in terms of GRDP between 1997 and 2002 (see Table 1 in 2.2).

In Bengkayang in 1997, hundreds of Madurese houses, market stalls and fields of crops were destroyed; violence brought day-to-day economic activities to a standstill for more than two months. Human Right Watch estimated that the damages at the point of origin of violence only – Sanggau Ledo – amounted to IDR 13.56 billion or $US 6 million. In Sambas the entire population of Madurese representing over 70,000 people lost their livelihoods and had their property destroyed or seized. Madurese have unsuccessfully sought to have the value of their seized assets calculated, including those that were destroyed and those now in the hands of others. In other sectors of the economy, however, there has been some progress, such as the revival of mandarin (jeruk) growing in the district of Sambas aided by the district office.

The conflict affected the economy in Central Kalimantan in the short and medium term. For several months after the 2001 conflict almost all economic activity came to a halt. 64 Over 40 percent of the population of Sampit was

56.) Visited by LIP team in February-March 2002.
57.) Sukamdi et al, op cit., 22.
58.) Singkawang, though part of Sambas district in 1999 (now the second municipality of the province after Pontianak), provided refuge for Madurese fleeing other parts of the district and the town of Sambas in 1999. Many Chinese traders and contractors in Singkawang have long used Madurese labourers. Most parts of Sambas are still off-limits for Madurese.
59.) In Sambas district, 1,874 households comprised of 10,321 people lived in four camps; in Pontianak district 3,547 households account for 18,878 people in 11 camps, and in Pontianak (city) 7,051 households or 39,735 people lived in 11 camps.
61.) International Crisis Group, op. cit. Some informants in Sampit claim that more than 1,000 people died, mainly Madurese, and some estimates go as high as 7,000 dead, but an accurate count will probably never be known.
64.) Interviews in Sampit and Palangka Raya, June 2004. The LASEMA-LIPI research in Kalimantan in March 2002 had similar findings.
Table 3
Human Development Index in Central Kalimantan, 1999 and 2002, by Regency and Percentage of Population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regency</th>
<th>Life expectancy</th>
<th>Adult literacy rate (%)</th>
<th>Mean years of schooling</th>
<th>Per capita expenditure *)</th>
<th>HDI</th>
<th>HDI ranking</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kotawaringin Timur</td>
<td>67.9</td>
<td>68.0</td>
<td>93.4</td>
<td>96.4</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kapuas</td>
<td>69.6</td>
<td>67.9</td>
<td>90.5</td>
<td>96.1</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palangka Raya</td>
<td>72.1</td>
<td>72.9</td>
<td>98.1</td>
<td>98.8</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Kalimantan</td>
<td>69.2</td>
<td>69.4</td>
<td>94.8</td>
<td>96.4</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*) In thousands of Indonesian rupiah.

Table 4
Human Poverty Index in Central Kalimantan, 1999 and 2002, by Regency and Percentage of Population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regency</th>
<th>People expected to survive to 40</th>
<th>Adult literacy rate (%)</th>
<th>Population without access to clean water</th>
<th>Population access to health facilities</th>
<th>HPI</th>
<th>HDI ranking</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kotawaringin Timur</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>80.5</td>
<td>64.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kapuas</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>71.4</td>
<td>73.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palangka Raya</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>71.3</td>
<td>59.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Kalimantan</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>68.2</td>
<td>66.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The violence had longer-term impacts upon the structure of the economy, particularly in the informal sector. Madurese were particularly affected in several sectors, including palm oil and timber. The impact of the conflict on human development in Central Kalimantan (at least for those who were not displaced) does not appear to have been substantial. From 1999 to 2002, Central Kalimantan actually rose one place in terms of national HDI ranking. However, it should be noted that the impact of the conflict on conflict-affected districts is ambiguous. The HPI suggests poverty increased in terms of national HDI ranking. Although both districts fell slightly in terms of national HDI ranking, the HPI suggests poverty increased in terms of national HDI ranking. Although both districts fell slightly in terms of national HDI ranking, they still have high poverty indices.

The violence had longer-term impacts upon the structure of the economy, particularly in the informal sector. Madurese were particularly affected in several sectors, including palm oil and timber. The impact of the conflict on human development in Central Kalimantan (at least for those who were not displaced) does not appear to have been substantial. From 1999 to 2002, Central Kalimantan actually rose one place in terms of national HDI ranking. However, it should be noted that the impact of the conflict on conflict-affected districts is ambiguous. The HPI suggests poverty increased in terms of national HDI ranking. Although both districts fell slightly in terms of national HDI ranking, they still have high poverty indices.

If one goes by statistics alone, the impact of the conflict on human development in Central Kalimantan (at least for those who were not displaced) does not appear to have been substantial. From 1999 to 2002, Central Kalimantan actually rose one place in terms of national HDI ranking. However, it should be noted that the impact of the conflict on conflict-affected districts is ambiguous. The HPI suggests poverty increased in terms of national HDI ranking. Although both districts fell slightly in terms of national HDI ranking, they still have high poverty indices.
Studies in Sampit and Palangka Raya gauged people’s perceptions of the post-conflict economy. Caution must be exercised in interpreting the results, due to the small sample sizes and to the nature of perception surveys. Such surveys can present a snapshot, but cannot give a diachronic view of perception fluctuation and change unless replicated. For instance, three years of economic decline followed by a slight improvement could be coded as ‘improvement’ depending on the methodology used. The most important caveat is that such surveys cannot show that a conflict has damaged or improved economic welfare, since we cannot know how the economy would have evolved in the absence of conflict, and in areas where ethnic cleansing has occurred, interviewees might have benefited, taking over new economic opportunities, land and jobs left by those who fled (and who, of course, cannot be part of the sample group).

Keeping in mind these caveats, Tables 5, 6 and 7 are presented for information purposes.

Table 5 *)
Informant Perceptions of Economic Welfare
2004 compared to 2001 (Pre-conflict) in Central Kalimantan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Opinion</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Much better than before conflict</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Slightly better</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>39.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Similar</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>37.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Slightly worse</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>12.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Much worse</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Do not know</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal</td>
<td>239</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persons missing or not available</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*) Data in this table, Table 6 and Table 7 was gathered in a survey made to Palangka Raya and Sampit in June 2004.

Table 6 *)
Informant Perceptions of their Income
2004 compared to 2001 (Pre-conflict) in Central Kalimantan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Opinion</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Much higher than before conflict</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Slightly higher</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>37.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Similar to before</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>27.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Slightly lower</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>14.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Much lower</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Uncertain</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>10.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>99.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persons missing or not available</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*) Data in this table, Table 6 and Table 7 was gathered in a survey made to Palangka Raya and Sampit in June 2004.

Table 7*
Informant Perceptions of their Employment Opportunities
2004 compared to 2001 (Pre-conflict) in Central Kalimantan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Opinion</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Much better than before conflict</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Slightly better</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>27.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Similar</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>36.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Slightly worse</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>18.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Much worse</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Uncertain</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>99.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persons missing or not available</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The violence in West and Central Kalimantan from 1997 to 2001 has also had a major impact on the province of East Java and in particular the island of Madura, where most of the Madurese fled. The IDPs have experienced a great deal of hardship and loss both during the exodus and following their arrival at Madura. The influx of large numbers of IDPs into Madura has also created problems for local communities and governments. Most IDPs arrived penniless, with no assets to resume their lives. Some still had family contacts in Madura, and in many cases could move in with them and share farm work, or at least enter village life. But some whose families had left Madura many generations ago had not maintained contact; these people had nobody to turn to and began the long wait in camps hastily set up by the provincial government and aid organisations.

Few Madurese, whether living with local relatives or in camps, enjoyed a permanent or secure income. Some found work in town as pedicab drivers, street vendors or construction workers, or worked as day labourers in the fields or people's homes.

The island of Madura, a poor region of East Java, could not absorb this influx of newcomers. Outside of the four main towns, little in the way of work exists beyond basic farming. There are virtually no industries or plantations; the land is owned by smallholders who work their own fields and care for cattle as a self-sufficient family unit, with occasional unpaid exchange work among neighbours. Madurese farmers rarely need to hire outside labour, and if they do, they prefer to do so with established networks in their own village. One IDP in Ketapang said that in the 30 months he had been in the camp, he had only found work a total of 6 days in the nearby villages. Working in the town was an option, but wages might not be enough to pay transportation costs. Consequently, most IDPs depended on the good graces of relatives or humanitarian assistance provided by the government to meet daily needs.

The government assistance programme for food and essentials ended in early 2004. Some people returned to Kalimantan before the end of aid (according to some estimates, around 7,000); following the end of the aid programme, the majority of Central Kalimantan refugees returned, and most of the remainder are awaiting the next allocation of government aid for returnees. From the very beginning, there were reports of aid monies gone astray (a subject treated in section 5.1.3). Many IDPs became burdened with debt once they had sold off whatever jewellery they had managed to salvage from Kalimantan. The sudden exodus also caused uncertainty for those who lost important documents. Only those who had the time to transfer their assets or civil servants (ex-parliamentarians, teachers and others) could consider themselves fortunate; at least they had the capital to start a business, could transfer to new positions in the civil service, or could draw salaries or pensions.

The influx of IDPs created burdens for local people in Madura, many of whom were already living below the poverty line. Moreover, the poorest district in Madura, Sampang, received the largest number of IDPs (86,261). Bangkalan district, not much better off, hosted the second largest number of IDPs (38,248), many of whom came from Sambas and are not likely to return in the near future.

With local people facing economic hardships of their own, the humanitarian assistance programme for IDPs at times creates tensions in the local community. Some IDPs compete for the very limited work opportunities open in the informal sector. IDPs who could open a business found themselves in a competitive, tight and relatively closed market environment. Difficulties are most frequent in the informal sector, in market trading and transportation. Due to the limited economic opportunities in Madura, a number of IDPs have already moved elsewhere in East Java, to Lampung in Sumatra and even to Malaysia. Some men go alone, leaving their families in Madura. For almost all those interviewed, the time spent in Madura is a sort of limbo; their intent, especially if they are from Central Kalimantan, is to return to Kalimantan (see section 5.2.2 regarding the return process).
4.3 Social and Political Impacts

The conflict has had a definite psychological impact on all people who were touched by it. The deep impact on the Madurese is painfully obvious; fortunately, there have been some initiatives taken by the government and NGOs to deal with their needs. Research in Kalimantan among Dayak and Malay fighters—nearly all of them male youths—reveals a vast reservoir of untreated trauma. Participants in the violence were forbidden by their leaders from discussing their roles with others, there was no way they could come to terms with their experiences. Many speak of nightmares and troubled thoughts due to their actions and the acts they witnessed during the riots.

More troubling for the future is the reservoir of violent actors with extensive training in ethnic warfare, some of whom are still proud of their achievements. Given that their actions (and those of their leaders) were met with impunity, some declare a readiness to embark on another campaign if called upon. Many violent actors—often disaffected youths before the conflict—have benefited from the post-conflict period, through paying jobs in neighbourhood militias or by taking over the assets, plantations or homes of fleeing IDPs. Such ill-gotten gains make it difficult to unlearn the violent training they received. In addition, not enough counselling programmes are aimed at these young ex-fighters.

Significantly, inquiries in Central and West Kalimantan in 2002 revealed a rising trend of youths carrying weapons, a cause for alarm among many citizens. IDPs interviewed in Madura in May 2005 spoke of insecurity as a continuing concern in Central Kalimantan, particularly for Madurese returnees.

4.3.1 West Kalimantan

In both provinces, the new Dayak resurgence, and in West Kalimantan the Malay resurgence, have transformed the landscape of local and provincial politics, both in terms of changing people and changing perceptions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>District / Municipality</th>
<th>Bupati</th>
<th>Deputy Bupati</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Ketapang</td>
<td>Malay</td>
<td>Dayak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Sintang</td>
<td>Dayak</td>
<td>Malay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Kapuas Hulu</td>
<td>Dayak (Muslim)</td>
<td>Dayak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Sambas</td>
<td>Malay</td>
<td>Malay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Bengkayang</td>
<td>Dayak</td>
<td>Malay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Landak</td>
<td>Dayak</td>
<td>Dayak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Pontianak</td>
<td>Malay</td>
<td>Dayak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Sanggau</td>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>Dayak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Sekadau</td>
<td>Malay</td>
<td>Currently vacant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Melawi</td>
<td>Malay</td>
<td>Currently vacant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Pontianak City</td>
<td>Malay</td>
<td>Malay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>Singkawang City</td>
<td>Malay</td>
<td>Dayak</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by the Department of Sociology (Labsos), UI.

As elsewhere in Indonesia new districts have been created in West Kalimantan. Currently, there are 10 districts and 2 municipalities (Pontianak and Singkawang). A power-sharing understanding now exists between Malay and Dayak elite. In areas where the population is evenly split between Malays and Dayaks, they will share the positions of bupati (district head/mayor) and deputy bupati. Where one group predominates, it will hold both positions. Table 8 shows the ethnicity of bupati and deputies in each district. Newly formed districts and municipalities are shown in italics.

Though power sharing appears to have forestalled serious direct conflict between the Dayak and the Malay populations, most educated urban-dwellers lament the lack of a genuine public discourse in West Kalimantan. They say the politicians only seem concerned with dividing up government positions between the two main ethnic groups, and sub-dividing the existing districts for political expedience. In 2003, a local magazine published reports, bringing to light 26 political scandals in the province but
only recently have the offending members of parliament been brought before the court. Members of Dayak and Malay ethnic organisations are known to have received logging concessions (HPHH). The district of Ketapang alone issued 66 HPHH concessions to local ethnic elites. The central government has recently revoked the district government’s right to issue new HPHH concessions, charging that the district government was incapable of controlling their operation. Tensions are rising surrounding the subject of natural resource extraction in the province. Whereas in the past tensions existed between local people and concessions based in Jakarta, now HPHH holders and local people clash with local government, police and the military over accusations of illegal logging.

A disturbing development is the rapidly increasing involvement of thugs during elections. Ridding the political system of thuggery is a key hurdle that must be overcome if the public is to be able to hold their elected leaders accountable. While thugs have always been present in local politics, before they were integrated into the security apparatus; now they work directly for individual politicians to intimidate rivals and organize mass demonstrations. In Pontianak in July 2004, the research team was informed by a high-ranking official that the bupati in a certain district had formed an ethnic self-defence association. Usually the creation of such associations heralds the start of local elections. They can be easily turned into militia for use during the campaigns, and of course the risk is that armed toughs of different ethnic groups supporting opposing candidates will square off.

Similar to other provinces, West Kalimantan has witnessed a phenomenal rise in the number of NGOs, many of which were set up in the aftermath of the violence. Some have begun to cooperate in order to economically empower ordinary people. Although most newly established NGOs or forums talk of the principles of pluralism, few have designed programmes to strengthen inter-ethnic relations. In fact, there are many indications that these forums were established to show the strength of various ethnic groups, functioning as vehicles to secure social or political positions and compete for economic and political opportunities.

In Central Kalimantan, as well, the conflict has caused insecurity among both the Dayak and non-Dayak communities. While some claim the conflict led to a decrease in crime, incarceration figures have actually increased in Kotawaringin Timur, epicentre of the violence (see Table 9). Some Javaneses and members of other ethnic groups have left Palangka Raya and Sampit due to trauma and a continued sense of insecurity. Following the conflict, many Dayaks expressed concern that in the future the Madurese would attempt to take revenge on them, though these fears have evidently now been put to the side since many Madurese have been allowed to return in 2004 and 2005. The major concern now for the peaceful reintegration of Madurese IDPs is the lack of transparency and management of the process of their return to Central Kalimantan, a subject that is examined in the chapter on Repatriation of IDPs (5.2.2).

### Table 9

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regency</th>
<th>1997</th>
<th>2002</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kotawaringin Timur</td>
<td>1,182</td>
<td>1,769</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palangka Raya</td>
<td>1,929</td>
<td>1,871</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kapuas</td>
<td>1,270</td>
<td>1,123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Kalimantan</td>
<td>7,430</td>
<td>9,638</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Kalimantan dalam Angka, 1997 and 2002

---


66.) Focus group discussions with community leaders in Landak, 22 July 2004.

67.) Focus group discussions with community leaders in Landak, 25 July 2004.

68.) Focus group discussions with various ethnic leaders in Landak, 17 July 2004.

69.) Direct elections for district leader were held first in Ketapang in June 2005 and will end in Sanggau in 2008 after the ratification of the law on regional heads.

70.) Interview with an NGO activist in Pontianak, 21 July 2004.

71.) Gemawan, a Malay NGO, cooperates with Pancur Kasih, a Dayak NGO, to develop credit union programmes (information from interview with a lecturer in social science at Tanjung Pura University, 19 July 2004).

Madurese were not politically influential in Central Kalimantan thus few significant political changes occurred in Palangka Raya and Kotawaringin Timur following the 2001 conflict. The National Awakening Party (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, PKB), party of former President Abdurachman Wahid (Gus Dur), however, lost much of its following when the Madurese were pushed out of the province. Most of the party’s supporters in Sampit were Madurese, and the PKB leader in Sampit, though himself a Banjarese, was forced to flee to Surabaya along with other IDPs because Dayaks accused him of being too close to the Madurese.

During the early years of the influx of IDPs, a cultural and social gap existed between locals in Madura and the newcomers. Although the displaced people are formally considered Madurese, locals regard them as distinct. For example, they refer to IDPs from Central Kalimantan as Sampitan (from Sampit). Locals often regarded IDPs as arrogant, impolite, with no respect for local culture and economic hardships of locals. It did not help that many IDPs could not speak the Madurese language fluently (a requirement in many parts of rural Madura). Some have difficulty explaining their link to distant relatives, who nonetheless accommodate them as quasi-family. Another marker of difference, Sampang locals send their children to religious schools while the IDPs tend to favour secular education.

However, this situation has gradually eased. The IDPs, recognising that the process of reconciliation in Kalimantan will take a long time, realized that they needed to engage in the local economy to make their livings, perhaps for an extended period. For their part, the locals have become more tolerant and understanding of the problems of the IDPs. Local perceptions of the IDPs are more positive, now seeing the displaced as creative and highly motivated, particularly those working hard in the informal sector in urban and rural areas. Some locals, of course, still regard the IDPs as generally lazy, arrogant and always seeking help and assistance from the government. In responding to such perceptions, the IDPs point to the limited economic opportunities available to newcomers. Many Madurese have returned to Kalimantan, and most of the barracks at the largest camp in Sampang are being dismantled, but at the same time, the social distance between remaining IDPs and the locals appears to be growing again.


74.) Based on discussions with IDPs in Ketapang, Sampang in May 2005.
5. Responses and Peace-building Initiatives

5.1 Humanitarian Assistance and Recovery

5.1.1 West Kalimantan

Immediately following the violence, local government and law enforcement agencies in West Kalimantan were somewhat responsive. They helped evacuate and shelter IDPs, arrested some perpetrators from each of the groups involved, initiated district- and subdistrict-level dialogs, and set up a relatively well-managed resettlement process for IDPs in temporary camps. NGOs meanwhile provided basic needs and trauma counselling to IDPs and organized reconciliation activities and ethnic forums.

The government, however, has been less efficient during the relocation phase. After the governor decided to relocate the IDPs from the conflict zones to camps in safe areas such as Singkawang and Pontianak, there was a complete lack of coordination among the various government agencies responsible. Each agency followed its own agenda, which was often in direct contradiction to that of other agencies. The IDPs were excluded from the decision-making processes.

Surya Wirawan. Berikan Hukum Pada Dia (Justice for All), hardboard cut, 10 X 10 cm, 2003.
To many it appeared that the main concern of local government agencies and politicians was to obtain a share of the IDR 66,649,250,000 earmarked by the central government for IDP relocation. Scant regard was paid to the demands of the IDPs and to their living conditions. In fact, those who attempted to improve the conditions in the camps were actively obstructed, notably the international NGO Doctors without Borders, which tried to provide better sanitation in the camps.\(^{75}\)

In 2003, the international NGO, Refugee International, reported on the inhumane conditions they found in several IDP camps in West Kalimantan. In 2004, UN OCHA conducted field visits to 12 out of the 13 IDP relocation sites. While their report stated that living conditions had improved since 2003, they also noted that few economic opportunities were open to IDPs. Because of this, a number of IDPs in sites near Pontianak moved back into the city in search of jobs.\(^{76}\)

Several local development NGOs are attempting to expand economic activities for the IDPs in the relocation areas. Catholic Relief Services (CRS) in cooperation with Gemawan, a local NGO, run a sustainable agriculture project.\(^{77}\) This project is aimed at improving food security in five relocation sites in Pontianak district (SP I, SP II, Parit Haji Ali, Bhakti Suci and Pulau Nyamuk). CSR also reports that a common problem faced by IDPs in the five sites concerns the ownership status of the land they are living on. Other international donors, along with local NGOs and the government have also been providing humanitarian aid to Madurese IDPs in the relocation sites since 2002.\(^{78}\) International Organisation for Migration (IOM) launched a cooperative river transportation project in 2002 to improve river access to IDP relocation sites.

In 2003, IOM enlarged its project to support the economic recovery of IDPs by providing soft credits, training in agricultural techniques, and a revolving fund\(^{79}\) that involved the local community. It was estimated that as many as 800 IDP households in four relocation sites would benefit from this one-year project costing US$ 350,000. World Vision International (WVI) also provided funds to support income generation and infrastructure in the relocation sites in 2003. WVI, in co-operation with the local government offices of social affairs and agriculture, allocated US$ 750,000 for the provision of basic agricultural inputs (tools, seed and seedlings) and a community-based health system. This assistance was targeted at 1,500 households comprising 7,500 individuals.

In the education sector, UNICEF and Save the Children-UK have been providing humanitarian assistance since 2002 with a particular emphasis on the support of primary school education. In cooperation with provincial and district offices of education, Save the Children allocated US$ 569,216 for two years targeted at 3,000 primary school IDP children living in relocation sites. UNICEF, in co-operation with local authorities and NGOs, provided US$ 380,016 for the support of primary school education and the protection of children’ rights in 2003, targeting approximately 12,000 school children.

The response of the security forces and the central government to the Sampit tragedy was tardy and inadequate. Although the conflict broke out on 18 February 2001, according to a report in Kompas on 26 February, reinforcements from Jakarta were sent in three days later, too late to provide a credible deterrent.\(^{80}\) Because of the severity of the massacre and the fact that the security forces were unable to stop it, the district head of Kotawaringin Timur took the decision to evacuate all

\(^{75}\) Davidson, op cit., 377.

\(^{76}\) Interview with editor-in-chief of Equator, 11 June 2004.


\(^{79}\) A revolving fund is a project in which target groups receive donor credit with low or no interest for a stipulated period of time. At the end of the period, the borrower from target group must rotate the credit to new members of the group.

Madurese by ship. About 70,000 to 80,000 Madurese were brought by ship to Surabaya in February and March 2001. Officials admit their response to the violence was hesitant and weak handed, but explain that, any measure taken by an institution during ethnic conflict would be criticized as tacit support for one side or the other.  

Little if any reconstruction work, income support programmes, post-conflict development or trauma counselling has been undertaken in Central Kalimantan. The primary victims of the conflict are in Madura and other parts of East Java and the aid programmes have logically been focused there. The local government in Kotawaringin Timur did some early social and psychological research on women and children in terms of trauma, but no significant follow-up occurred due to the of the district's limited resources. A local NGO, Nurani Dunia, took part in reconciliation work in the early post-conflict period.

5.1.3 Madura

A number of short-term initiatives have been implemented in Madura. Some humanitarian assistance programmes offer regular food, health care and cash aid. Other aid comes in the form of trauma recovery programmes. Aid for returnees to Central Kalimantan has been distributed since the end of government humanitarian assistance in 2004. The degree of success (or failure) of aid programmes has varied greatly from one site to another.

Aid allocations to villages have frequently been cut by village leaders and, it seems, by at least one IDP organisation in charge of channelling aid for returnees. Of the four districts, Sampang is the most notorious in this regard. Problems have arisen due to the way the aid distribution was and still is organized.

It was left to the discretion of each village chief to assess any negative effects of aid provision to IDPs who were living among locals (who were themselves poor). A village chief could elect to distribute some of the aid to needy non-IDP villagers. There are also frequent charges that local elites and leaders of IDP organisations divert funds for their own use. Preliminary investigations suggest little corruption has taken place in Pamekasan and Sumenep districts, perhaps because few IDPs are in those districts. The same cannot necessarily be said of Sampang, however, where there is a large contingent of IDPs. IDPs, journalists, NGOs and leaders of IDP organisations suggest that poor supervision of the distribution of aid has provided a golden opportunity for district functionaries, local leaders, thugs, and even a few Madurese IDPs from Sampit to enrich themselves. They have urged the central government to order an audit. (For more on the aid disbursement for returnees, see the end of section 5.2.2).

The Indonesian government also provided an employment training and creation programme for IDPs through the social affairs office (Dinsos), but the programme was ineffective. It was unclear whether the programme was designed to facilitate long-term integration or short-term support. In addition, the programme did not take into account the capacity of the local economy. The structure of market development is limited, regional economic growth is low, and local purchasing power is low. IDPs maintain that lack of capital is their main stumbling block. The local government responds that IDPs are not doing enough to improve their economic situation.

Another problem with such programmes has been that funds designed as capital for entrepreneurship have been used for food and daily necessities.

The response of the local parliament (DPRD) has been quite limited. IDP viewpoints are seldom taken

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81.) When President Gus Dur came to Sampit, Dayaks regarded him as a supporter of the Madurese because his family roots are in Jombang, East Java.
82.) Like the government humanitarian and food aid, this aid comes from the general budget of the central government.
83.) Interviews with all these categories of informants personally and through group discussions in late April and early May 2005. Many interviewed noted the rapidly improving economic situations of certain facilitators who over a short period of time came to possess new homes and vehicles.
84.) Interviews with local members of parliament and local government officials in Madura, 2004.
into account. The Bangkalan local government and parliament prioritize the immediate return or relocation of IDPs without insisting on a clear programme design for preventing new conflicts and achieving a longer-term peace process, leaving that responsibility to the central government. Competition between the largest local political parties, PKB and the United Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, PPP), has led them to take different positions on the management of IDPs. PKB has joined civil society organisations and local media in criticizing local and district government for perpetuating a situation in which corruption can thrive. They also criticise the lack of management of the return process. PPP generally supports the local government’s actions.

Some NGOs have undertaken initiatives to build local empowerment. Fatayat NU, a women’s NGO in Bangkalan, is one of the most active, playing an important role in education, with funding from Oxfam. This NGO has taken a progressive line in its work to empower women socially and economically, and focuses on the social and cultural integration of IDPs into local Madurese communities. Fatayat NU has made significant contributions in teaching local history and culture to IDP children, especially from Sambas, and bringing young IDPs into joint learning programmes with local children. It is also active in providing training for local teachers and other IDPs from Sambas. A difficulty experienced by many other NGOs, however, is the lack of kinship ties to IDPs that would lead them to take a more personal interest in the problems faced by IDPs.

Significant initiatives regarding the reduction of socio-economic inequality to achieve the wider goals of Peace-building and integration have yet to be implemented in Madura. Major efforts have been focused on the provision of humanitarian assistance on an emergency aid basis, and on socio-economic empowerment to give IDPs psychological, social and economic support. These initiatives satisfy IDP short-term needs, but do not address the equally important need for a long-term Peace-building and reintegration framework in the context of the return to Kalimantan.

### 5.2 Peace-building and the Repatriation of IDPs

#### 5.2.1 Peace-building

There are three alternatives to settle the problem of IDPs in Madura: return to Kalimantan, integration into Madurese society, and resettlement elsewhere in Indonesia. The major focus has been on returning IDPs to Kalimantan in an atmosphere of reconciliation, and most of the discussion in this section will deal with this possibility. Regarding the second alternative—social integration in Madura—only a few programmes have been implemented, typically temporary rather than long-term, since most observers believe Madura’s ability to absorb newcomers permanently is severely limited. Relocation to other areas is unacceptable to most IDPs.

The first peace meetings were carried out between Dayaks and Madurese in Jakarta and Palangka Raya. On 21 March 2001, an agreement sponsored by the central government was reached between Dayaks and Madurese aimed at bringing an end to the conflict. In the meeting it was agreed that the roots of the conflict were to be found in the policies of previous governments, cultural disputes, poor law enforcement and security management, and few programmes aimed at poverty alleviation and human resource development for the Dayaks. The parties agreed that, since two of the main causes of conflict were culture and demographic change, regulations on migration control needed to be established and traditional adat needed to be revitalised.

Community leaders and some economic actors from both ethnic groups at the grass-roots level also initiated a process of reconciliation. During the last few years, representatives have built mutual understanding through communication. Some Dayak leaders travelled to Madura for discussion with IDP informal leaders and invited the

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85) Interview with Hj Djum’atul Cholishah, head of Fatayat NU, Bangkalan.
IDPs to return. Likewise some Madurese attended a local community meeting in Kalimantan held by the Dayak community for building mutual understanding and local reconciliation. Nevertheless, such interaction only occurred among the Dayaks and Madurese originating from specific areas in Central Kalimantan, notably the rural areas around Sampit and Pangkalanbun. The Dayaks who came to Madura and invited the Madurese to return generally came from areas that suffered severe economic effects following the departure of the Madurese. Until recently, it appeared unlikely that offers to return would come from other areas such as the urban Palangka Raya, Sampit, or (in West Kalimantan) Sambas, where economic effects were less severe or where there was more opposition to allowing the Madurese to return and reclaim their former assets and occupations.

Attempts at Peace-building undertaken in West Kalimantan have been largely unsuccessful. Most peace ceremonies in the province were sponsored by the government (ikrar perdamaian), a rite of reconciliation commonly used during the New Order era. Typically, local leaders, such as district and subdistrict heads, army and police commanders and Dayak and Madurese elites, attended these ceremonies. The ceremonies were never designed to resolve real problems and the legitimacy of those who signed these peace accords were often questioned by their respective communities. Worst of all, the contents of these accords were usually prepared by the military in advance with no input whatsoever from those involved in the conflict.

In addition, no peace accord was possible after the 1999 ethnic violence involving Malays and the Madurese because the Malays—in a dominant position—simply stated that the Madurese way of life was incompatible with local cultural norms. In 2001, following the refugee riot, no peace accord was signed because the Malays objected to the inclusion of the word ‘peace’ in the conference title, ‘A Deliberation of Peace among Indonesians in the Land of the Equator’ (Musyawarah Domai Anak Bangsa di Bumi Khatulistiwa). Malays continue to assert that the Madurese had continually failed to adjust to the local way of life.

One issue that is central to the creation of sustainable peace in the province is the outstanding question of the former Madurese IDPs who want to return to their homes in Sambas. Attempts have been made by the Madurese to achieve this purpose. Under the auspices of the government office of religious affairs, a sort of religious diplomacy was conducted when Madurese ulemas were chosen as referees in an Al-Qur’an recital competition in Sambas in 2003. A delegation of ulemas from Madura Island also visited the office of the district government of Sambas to apologise for the past mistakes of the Sambas Madurese. This initiative, however, failed to open up the possibility for ordinary Madurese to return to their homes and property.

Some organisations and individuals are working hard for reconciliation. In West Kalimantan the Indonesian Congress of Women (Kowani) helped provide humanitarian aid in the aftermath of the 1999 ethnic violence in Sambas. During the refugee riot in 2001, individual women leaders emerged and together with Kowani established a campaign to show solidarity with the Madurese IDPs. They gave support by organising food parcels and pressured the governor, the military and police commanders to act to stop the violence.

After the 2001 riot, the Peace Forum for West Kalimantan (Forum Perdamaian untuk Kalbar), a multi-ethnic women’s NGO aimed at fostering peace, was

86.) All Ikrar Perdamaian (peace accords) that have been conducted in West Kalimantan contained similar statements. They appealed to all ethnic groups to maintain the spirit of national unity. Indeed, they were successful in stopping the ongoing episode of violence but were unable to prevent subsequent episodes.
87.) Interview with a Dayak intellectual in Pontianak, 20 July 2004.
88.) Interview with the chief editor of a daily newspaper in Pontianak, 9 July 2004.
89.) Interview with Iqbal Djajadi, 20 July 2004. He is a PhD student at the University of Nijmegen in the Netherlands, who has been conducting research in West Kalimantan since 2002.
formed. Its activities consist of discussion groups involving ethnic leaders and running public campaign in the print and broadcast media. The Institute of the Empowerment of Women and Children (Lembaga Pemberdayaan Wanita dan Anak) is a similar organisation. Unfortunately, the persistence of patriarchal society, illustrated by the absolute dominance of male leaders in the customary councils, presents obstacles to women's NGOs and continues to marginalize their roles.

Most NGOs in the capital city of Pontianak work along ethnic lines: Pancur Kasih for the Dayaks, Gemawan for the Malays, and Mitra Sekolah Masyarakat (MISEM) for the Madurese. Gemawan, which develops credit unions, mainly works among the Malay community. This credit programme appears to be a successful imitation of the credit programme run by PK. According to reliable sources, Pancur Kasih has been negotiating with Cordaid, a Dutch NGO, to manage an inter-ethnic peace project with a budget of IDR 15 billion. The Ford Foundation has established an endowment amounting to US$ 500,000.

The Dayak grass-roots movement led by Yayasan Pangigu Binua (YPB) states that the organisation cherishes a healthy plural society. Its missions focus on the empowerment of Dayak customary territories (Binua) and institutions, and the empowerment of the local economy through the formation of a credit union. Its credit union programme, supported by Pancur Kasih, has attracted more than 1,000 members from different ethnic origins. However, its mission to promote Dayak empowerment tends to contradict its pluralist vision. YPB is also campaigning to reinstate Dayak adat law. YPB has conducted a series of meetings, attended by the tumenggung, to formulate a draft legislative plan for Dayak local governance (locally referred to as the Perda Binua). Other ethnic groups across the province are keeping a watchful eye on this development. Although they claim they are inclusive, none of these NGOs make systematic efforts to strengthen social cohesion between different ethnic groups. While this may be due more to organisational limitations than to any intent on their part, this is currently one of the key latent political issues in West Kalimantan that could have serious repercussions, particularly for ethnic minorities.

The Madurese in West Kalimantan question the YPB legislative plan by arguing that it is difficult for non-Dayaks to obey two types of laws at the same time, i.e., national and Dayak laws. A similar critical argument has even been publicly stated by a local Dayak bureaucrat, Adrianus A.S., in 2003. He warns of the danger for future interethnic cooperation if the plan is ratified. The low income and educational level of most Dayaks, the militancy of certain Dayak sub-ethnic groups, and the exclusionary nature of other customary laws in this legislative plan are cited as factors that could impact negatively on interethnic cooperation.

NGOs and the mass media have also played important roles in bridging communication between different ethnic groups and building the integration process within the local community in Madura. Search for Common Ground in Indonesia (SFCGI) has facilitated the Peace-building process. SFCGI also held a programme for IDP children designed to promote trauma recovery and to teach alternatives to taking revenge. Mass media in Madura also plays a significant role in the field of peace journalism. The local daily newspapers, including Radar Madura and Duta, and radio and television in Central Kalimantan cooperate to establish a system of reporting which promotes peace-building processes and avoids stimulating conflicts.

The 2003 reconciliation meeting established an institution called Betang Media Centre (BMC). The

90.) Focus group discussions with women leaders in Pontianak on 23 July 2004.
92.) Focus group discussions with Madurese leaders in Ketapang, 16 July 2004.
institution plans to establish an information network in order to prevent the distortion of information and to socialize peace-building initiatives within the community. BMC includes representatives of each ethnic group, such as Madurese ulamas, leaders of the IDP organisations, Banjar community leaders, Dayak community leaders and local DPRD members. Currently, the organisation is ineffective, because the participation of Madurese representatives is limited. One Madurese said that there have been no activities since he was invited to Jakarta for the inauguration. It appears the organisation cannot yet stand on its own two feet and thus depends on continued support from SFCGI.

Since 2001, the central government and local governments have launched major initiatives without any clear follow up. The government’s role was limited to the provision of aid. Real action in the field was left to NGOs (local, national and international), universities, as well as some UN representatives. These organisations initiated a number of strategic activities to facilitate the reconciliation process and also to provide information and monitoring. The local government has recently been playing a role in the return of IDPs to Kalimantan. However, the response of the two regencies in Madura with the largest IDP presence has been very limited. At the same time, the local governments of the two provinces in Kalimantan have implemented local regulations, which among other things regulate the inflow of Madurese in those provinces.

5.2.2 Repatriation of IDPs

In general, Madurese IDPs from West Kalimantan, especially from Sambas, do not wish to return. They are pessimistic about the viability of a return due to the frequent outbreaks of violence there, the firm rejection by Malays and Dayaks regarding their return, the small chance of retrieving their assets, and the fear they would have to go to unattractive relocation zones. The riot in Pontianak in 2001 reinforced their disinclination to return. Thus, they are more concerned and critical about the level of financial aid for living costs and employment creation in Madura.

The situation regarding IDPs from Central Kalimantan is perhaps more complex. Up until 2004, most of these IDPs (especially the men wished to return to their homes in Kalimantan. Most eagerly awaited a government-sponsored repatriation programme that would include important financial aid. Others, not willing to wait, returned to Central Kalimantan on their own initiative. Some resettled with little problem, but others sent back information indicating that all was not well. Still others returned only temporarily in order to assess the situation.

In early 2004, the first disbursements of the financial aid package were made in the absence of any official return process. Therefore, it is instructive to look back on the sorts of initiatives that were made, what sort of negotiations were tabled, and what became of the much-awaited return process in the case of the Central Kalimantan IDPs.

A number of initiatives to build ethnic reconciliation have been implemented, the first soon after the riots. Over the last four years, representatives of the Madurese and Dayak communities held several important meetings in Batu Malang, Semarang and Jakarta. These meetings were generally facilitated by NGOs like SFCGI. The lacklustre response to the peace ceremonies suggested severe difficulties surrounding attempts to return the IDPs to Central Kalimantan. Some members of the local elite in

94.) Some organisations that might be noted here are PMI, WFP, SFCGI, World Bank, UNDP, IMC, Airlangga University and Nurani Dunia. The Union of Churches (Persekutuan Gereja-Gereja di Indonesia, PGI) in Jakarta and one of its members the Christian Evangelist Church (Gereja Kristen Evangelis, GKE) of Banjarmasin organised several peace workshops in Central Kalimantan from 2002 until mid-2004.

95.) Beside the local regulation (LR) of population set by the provincial government of Central and West Kalimantan, each regency within those provinces also set the same kind of regulation, i.e. LR of Kapuas Regency No. 11/2003, LR of Palangka Raya city No. 15/2003, and LR of East Kotawaringin No. 2/2003.

96.) It is important to note that in one focus group discussion in Pamekasan in April 2003, women IDPs expressed a great deal of reluctance to return to Central Kalimantan, almost all fearing that in the absence of any credible security guarantees their husbands would be drawn into renewed conflicts and violence. Their husbands were all intent on returning as soon as possible.
Central Kalimantan, including Dayaks, Malays, Banjarese and most of their local community leaders were willing to accept the Madurese back provided a selection process was put into place. First of all, Madurese eligible for return had to be those who had never been involved in acts of unrest. Second, Madurese leaders and intellectuals should be prevented from returning. The rationale for this selection process was the assumption that those problematic Madurese were the source of the conflict, a debatable premise for negotiations.

It soon became clear that a number of Dayaks in Central Kalimantan rejected any notion of a Madurese return, and they were against the restoration of Madurese assets and property. Some informants of the study mentioned that among these dissenters were young politicians, entrepreneurs, thugs and other local people who had taken over Madurese assets and property. The reasons behind their position were threefold: As mentioned earlier, many Dayaks were worried about the Madurese seeking vengeance; many sought to maintain the momentum of the recent revitalisation of Dayak customary institutions and culture that had been marginalised because of domination of other ethnic groups and economic and political policies of the state; and some Dayak groups sought to preclude the return of the Madurese due to the fact that they had secured economic or political gain as a result of the removal of the Madurese.

Following the meeting in Jakarta and congress in Palangka Raya, the Madurese also conducted a conference for IDPs in Sampang, Madura, on 22 August 2001 focused on the return of IDPs to Central Kalimantan. In February 2002, in Batu Malang, there was another meeting to discuss the peace-building process and the return of IDPs to Central Kalimantan. The main points to come out of the Batu Malang meeting were that indigenous Central Kalimantan people would agree to the return of the Madurese under two preconditions: only ‘good’ Madurese would be allowed to return, and the process of the return should be arranged gradually and naturally (alami). A Congress of Central Kalimantan People was conducted in Palangka Raya from 4 to 7 June. Dayaks again agreed on the Madurese returning to Central Kalimantan, again dependent on several conditions, including a gradual return. Madurese who had previously lived in Central Kalimantan also had to apologise to the Dayaks for causing the conflict, and for the killings of Dayaks. The Madurese accepted the terms of this peace process, which was mediated by the central government.

A series of local regulations have since been implemented in Central Kalimantan regarding the return of Madurese IDPs. The provincial government executed regulation No. 9/2001, concerning the process of peace and the return of Madurese. Article 2 states: “the return of IDPs is based on the equal right of citizen to live together in peace” and “respect to local norm and values (adat)”. The first statement derives from the human right that every Indonesian citizen has the equal right to live anywhere in Indonesia territory. The second statement makes clear, however, that migrants should respect local traditional culture and norms. Articles 6 and 7 state that IDPs must re-register with local authorities in order to be considered for repatriation. To do this they must provide a previous ID card and proof of home ownership and a permanent job in Central Kalimantan.

Also controversial are the regulations concerning adat, specifically the role and authority of the demang as a traditional leader to preserve traditional regulations, norms and values, and resolve any problems dealing with the violation of traditional law or norms. Thus in the process of reconciliation, the local government has reemphasised the right and authority of Dayak community leaders in dealing with the Madurese or any migrants in Central Kalimantan.

The revitalisation of the demang is designed to restructure and revitalise local (Dayak) culture to be the dominant...
culture in Central Kalimantan. Re-registration of migrants is another way to control the number of migrants, and in particular weed out ‘undesirable’ migrants attempting to return to the province.

Thus, as in West Kalimantan, the Dayak authorities have sought to place adat law on an equal footing with national law. It is debatable which should have precedence when the national code allows any Indonesian citizen to live anywhere in Indonesia is in conflict with local limitations on the types of migrants who are to be granted entry and the question of who will determine when a migrant accused of violating a traditional law or norm is subject to expulsion. New regulations continued nonetheless to be drafted in each district.

The local government of Kotawaringin Timur followed by drawing up two regulations. Perda Kotawaringin Timur No. 15/2004 focused on restoring the role of demang. The regulation was based on the perception that the absence of strong local institutions created cultural uncertainty in dealing with violations of the local culture, such as land disputes, personal quarrels and even criminal incidents such as murder. With this new authority, the demang as traditional judge (kepala adat) is able to decide and prescribe traditional punishment for those who violate traditional law.

The other regulation, Perda No. 2/2003, requires permanent migrants arriving in Kotawaringin Timur to report to the local administration at least 14 days after their arrival. This regulation is designed to limit the number of illegal Madurese migrants in the district. In Palangka Raya, a similar regulation, was released primarily to deal with the impact of conflict. The regulation prescribes the acceptance of only certain Madurese to Palangka Raya over a long period. The requirements for their return are:
1) having a local ID card or being registered as a local citizen before February 2001,
2) having a Dayak spouse,
3) non-involvement in the conflict,
4) having a good record with the local police, and
5) being able to adapt to local people and culture.

The regulation states that the local government will protect Madurese property as long as there is legal title.

In Kapuas district, the local government executed Perda No. 5/2001 regulating the function of the demang as a leader with the power to apply adat law. In this sense, the demang is a partner of the subdistrict head (camat) for the management of local affairs, though in practice he primarily deals with traditional affairs and the violation of adat law in particular. Dayak local traditions thereby become the main cultural reference not only for the Dayaks but also for all residents. Another regulation, Perda No. 11/2003, states that the return of IDPs should be carried out in stages: 1) first, IDPs who are government employees and members of the local assembly; 2) those who lived in Kapuas for more than 10 years; 3) those who have lived in the city less than 10 years; 4) those who have lived 3 to 10 years in village and city. Almost all informants interviewed frankly reject the return of the Madurese. But to legally ban the Madurese living in Central Kalimantan is almost impossible since it violates principles of human rights and the Indonesian constitution.

The discussion of the terms of peace is, therefore, highly complex and problematic as concerns Central Kalimantan, particularly in this context of legal stalemate, if not the active construction of legal hurdles. For a certain number of Dayaks, peace with the Madurese means ‘living in separate lands,’ and as long as they carry influence it is hard to see how the Madurese can ever feel secure in Central Kalimantan. As long as many districts with Dayak majorities still officially disapprove of their unconditional return, significant obstacles to sustainable peace will remain as the large-scale, non-sponsored return of IDPs to Central Kalimantan continues apace.

98.) Perda Palangka Raya No. 15/2003, Article 3. All the district-level regulations (LR) were based on the Perda regulation No. 9/2001, and benefit from its legal umbrella (payung hukum).
Many villages in Madura have now seen up to 80 percent of their IDP population return to Kalimantan. The remaining IDPs are awaiting the final disbursements of relocation aid. Only a few will remain in Madura by the end of 2005 if the trend continues.

When IDPs were interviewed in April 2003 and again that November, most were adamant that they would not return to Kalimantan before the central government sponsored an ordered process of return, with guarantees for their security. Their determination to get action on the question of returnees, along with the problems of humanitarian and returnee aid disbursement was so serious that many called for demonstrations and a march to the East Java provincial seat of Surabaya to press their demands (IDP leaders prevailed upon them to remain patient and not carry through with the demonstrations). Nevertheless, by the end of 2003, several thousand IDPs had returned on their own to Kalimantan, and at least one IDP association was actively engaging with a Kalimantan subdistrict to facilitate returns. Little news filtered out from the returnees concerning their reception, but IDPs in Madura considered the situation in Central Kalimantan still not conducive to mass returns. The passage of the district regulations regarding returnees did not serve to change this majority opinion.

The end of humanitarian aid and the start of aid disbursement for returnees at the beginning of 2004 no doubt spurred many to reconsider a return to Central Kalimantan, despite the lack of any organized return process. When IDP settlements were revisited in May 2005, up to 80 percent of their IDPs had already returned and the remainder were fully intent on returning once they received returnee aid.

The aid itself is in the form of a lump sum based on family size, and is supposed to be used to pay the cost of transportation to Kalimantan, repair homes, purchase tools and agricultural necessities, as well as provide food subsistence before harvests arrive or employment is found. The base amount per family is IDR 3 million (US$ 310), to which is added IDR 500,000 (US$ 52) per family member. Thus, a family of five should receive IDR 5.5 million (US$ 570). The aid comes from the central government’s general budget, and transits through the social affairs office (Dinsos) in each of Madura’s four districts.

Preliminary inquiries among IDPs in Pamekasan and Sumenep districts suggest the aid is disbursed to IDPs (in Sumenep in full, in Pamekasan minus an administrative fee of approximately IDR 200,000) with little difficulty. In Sampang, however, according to IDPs interviewed in three areas of the district, it appears that aid disbursements are a contentious issue. In Sampang, the government funding is channelled through an IDP association, which also handles the registration of IDPs. Some IDPs declined to comment, but others told of aid disbursements being reduced by IDR 500,000 (US$ 52) at least. A reliable IDP informant who has been watching developments in Sampang explained that IDPs are receiving less than what they are entitled to due to two practices. The maximum number of family members is limited to four, meaning that the maximum disbursement can only be IDR 5 million (US$ 515). Also, people are required to go through intermediaries who offer to help IDPs obtain their aid swiftly for a fee. The fees are at least IDR 1 million and can go as high as IDR 2 million (US$ 103 to US$ 206). The intermediaries are said to include local thugs and, more surprisingly (or sadly), IDPs from Sampit.

In subsequent interviews, officials at the IDP association (some of whom were likely intermediaries) denied that any administrative fees or other charges were made and countered that IDPs received the full amount due, down to the last cent. One did admit, however, that grateful IDPs would offer a token of appreciation to the person.

100.) Interviews in all four districts of Madura.
101.) Suspicions were voiced in 2003 that the subdistrict leader was keen to receive large numbers of Madurese votes for the upcoming campaign for district head.

102.) One informant said he had been told by reliable sources that each returnee family was entitled to IDR 5 million (instead of 3 million) as base family entitlement, to which would be added the IDR 500,000 per family member.
who facilitated their application, but such gifts were by no means mandatory. After our return from Madura, a Madurese legislator from the PKB party, Mahfud MD, presented evidence of corruption of IDR 48 billion (US$ 4.9 million) in Sampang aid monies before the Commission to Eradicate Corruption (Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi, KPK) in Jakarta on 26 May 2005.103

The May 2005 interviews in Madura also touched on the situation in Central Kalimantan, based on reports received from other IDPs. The rest of this section contains only second-hand information, received from Madurese IDPs in Madura, as it was not possible to make an updated field survey in Kalimantan. The questions raised by the rapid resettlement without government supervision of tens of thousands of IDPs are sufficiently urgent that these second-hand reports are included. Most of the reports were discouraging, though all the Madurese questioned still planned to return and see for themselves. The main problems had to do with areas that are off-limits for Madurese, and the presence of squatters in Madurese homes and on their land.

In some areas of Central Kalimantan, village or neighbourhood heads have declared they will not receive any incoming Madurese. It is difficult to determine how widespread this practice is, but a few IDPs said their family members or friends could not return to their homes and had to return to Madura or find another place to live in Kalimantan. One IDP said his family was trying to sell their home in one of the off-limits areas, so far without success.

Very often, if not systematically, IDPs' homes have been occupied or looted during their exile. In order to reoccupy their homes, the Madurese IDPs have to pay compensation for future lost housing and harvest revenues to the squatters to entice them to leave. Amounts range from IDR 3 to 7 million (US$ 310 to 722), with IDR 30 million (US$ 3,100) mentioned in one case. Homes that are not occupied have usually been stripped of all useable wood, meaning that returnees will have to put in new flooring or make other costly repairs.

According to some reports, certain types of employment are now off-limits to Madurese. Stevedoring, which Madurese largely handled before 2001, is said to now be off-limits to them. Rumour has it that Madurese will not be allowed to open shops in the market, but must sell their wares on the pavement. Another IDP denied this, however, saying he was told during a short trip home that he could open a kiosk in the market in Sampit as soon as the current lease was up.

The most negative reports speak of a climate of intimidation, provocation and insecurity, and a fear that Madurese are being forced to assume a role of second-class citizens. One key Madurese elite decided to put off returning to Central Kalimantan for the time being due to these reports; another renounced the idea entirely.104


104) Interviewed in Sampang and Sumenep in May 2005.
Peace Vulnerabilities

The incidents of violence examined in this document occurred against a background of social and economic structures that differentiate Kalimantan from other Indonesian conflict zones. In Kalimantan one finds: a) large-scale exploitation of natural resources on the periphery of a nation-state, b) indigenous communities who consider themselves ‘sons of the soil’ undergoing an ethno-nationalist awakening rooted in the belief development and its economic and political benefits are somehow escaping them; c) growing resentment of migrants who are seen to represent the state’s monopoly over land and resources and its disregard for indigenous laws and prerogatives. Similar ‘sons of the soil’ dynamics have developed into some of Asia’s longest lasting civil wars, which underlines the

6.1 Peace Vulnerabilities

The incidents of violence examined in this document occurred against a background of social and economic structures that differentiate Kalimantan from other Indonesian conflict zones. In Kalimantan one finds: a) large-scale exploitation of natural resources on the periphery of a nation-state, b) indigenous communities who consider themselves ‘sons of the soil’ undergoing an ethno-nationalist awakening rooted in the belief development and its economic and political benefits are somehow escaping them; c) growing resentment of migrants who are seen to represent the state’s monopoly over land and resources and its disregard for indigenous laws and prerogatives. Similar ‘sons of the soil’ dynamics have developed into some of Asia’s longest lasting civil wars, which underlines the


Mohamad Yusuf. Menanam Melawan (Planting Resistance); etching, 32 X 27.5 cm, 2003.
importance of understanding and addressing the structural and proximate causes in Kalimantan.\textsuperscript{107}

Fortunately, there exist signs for optimism in a number of districts in both West and Central Kalimantan where strong institutions and determined communities marked their refusal to be drawn into a cycle of violence. Ketapang was one of the many districts in West Kalimantan that had conflict, but no violence. The district-based Dayak Customary Council (DAD) was capable of bridging the divide between the state and the Dayak community, aided by a government and security apparatus that gave DAD and Dayak community leaders the leeway to push ahead and swiftly mediate disputes using adat law. Violent conflicts in West Kalimantan were restricted to a few districts, but even within those districts community leaders proactively sought to prevent violence. In the subdistricts of Sebangki and Ambawang in Landak District, Dayak leaders organised Tolak Balak ritual ceremonies. Pangkalangbun city and Barito in Central Kalimantan suffered attacks, but were able to avoid large scale massacres.

There appear to be four main issues that must be addressed to ensure they are not a source of violent conflict: In West Kalimantan, the return of Madurese IDPs to their homes in Sambas and rest of province; in Central Kalimantan, the return of IDPs from Madura; in both provinces, the next wave of district elections and the increasing involvement of militia groups; and the risk of new horizontal inequalities. Other issues in Kalimantan with the potential to create tensions must also be monitored, such as the allocation of logging, plantation and mining concessions; illegal logging and mining; the creation of new districts, and the continuing debates on the role of adat law.

\textsuperscript{107} The difference between the Kalimantan riots and other conflicts in Asia (or, specifically in Indonesia, the situations in Papua and Aceh) is that the Kalimantan violence has not developed into insurgencies.

West Kalimantan will have to deal with several key vulnerabilities on the path to sustainable peace. The right of Madurese to return and resettle in their original homes is an issue that will not go away. The increasing prevalence of thuggery in politics, as districts prepare for elections, is another urgent issue. Criminal acts must be investigated and their authors prosecuted with speed and transparency lest they take on an ethnic colouring. All semblance of legitimacy must be removed from vigilante justice. Irregular militia must be brought under very strict control, or disbanded, particularly if they practice intimidation and incitement.

Negotiations for the return of IDPs to their homes in West Kalimantan, particularly to the town of Sambas, should be resumed through a government-sponsored return process that brings all stakeholders on board. The majority of the 70,000 Madurese IDPs in 13 relocation sites in 2002 wish to return, and many IDPs in Madura could be persuaded to return if provided security guarantees. The attempts at reconciliation and religious diplomacy initiated by the provincial and local governments are steps in the right direction that should be renewed. The precondition for ensuring that the interests of all parties are taken into account, including reticent Malays, is transparency in governance and law enforcement. Bold measures are called for because the status quo in Sambas sets an unacceptable precedent, spelling danger for the future of plural communities, not only in Kalimantan but throughout Indonesia.

Thuggery (premanisme) in politics and society is a primary vulnerability for peace in the province. Judicial action \textsuperscript{108} and the growing public opposition to this threat to democratic institutions are salutary, but the problem is deep-seated. In West Kalimantan, ethnic associations play a powerful role in working for political and economic advantages for their base, and as such hold the potential

\textsuperscript{108} Recent actions against corruption and illegal logging are likewise positive developments that should be pursued.
to increase communal tension. Inter-ethnic associational relationships are still embryonic, most big ethnic associations tending to represent one ethnic group, take sides during political campaigns and thus contribute to inter-elite ethnic tensions. Although some NGOs have developed a degree of inter-ethnic cooperation, most still prioritize the strengthening of ethnic identities.

Isolated incidents of violent ethnic crime continue in the province and hold the potential to cause wider conflict. Regularly one hears of fights and even killings where ethnicity, criminality or juvenile gangs are involved. Fortunately, the police have recently become more responsive to these crimes, and have been involving community leaders in their efforts.

As mentioned at the outset to this chapter, traditional Dayak forms of dispute resolution represent a potential capacity for peace in the province. The efforts of the Dayaks to construct an institution of conflict management should be examined more closely.

The primary issue of concern is the ongoing return of most of the Madurese IDPs to Central Kalimantan. As discussed above, most IDPs from Central Kalimantan seek to return to their homes; indeed, four difficult years in Madura have presented them with few alternatives. For this to occur without a repeat of violence, successful reconciliation between local Dayak communities and the Madurese IDPs must occur. Despite the repeated requests of Madurese IDPs, the central government has decided not to institute an ordered and guaranteed process of return, acceding to the desire of Kalimantan local governments that returns be effected on a gradual, case-by-case basis (referred to as natural or alami), with reception of returnees at the discretion of neighbourhood or village leaders. On the surface this ‘natural return process’ is apparently working, to the extent that vast numbers of IDPs are now in or on their way to Central Kalimantan; how well it is working is open to question.

The reports of some Madurese returnees—who say they have been prevented from returning to certain neighbourhoods or villages they once inhabited, forced to pay compensation to squatters on their property, denied access to certain economic zones or types of employment, subject to intimidation or provocation, or in a word, being treated as second-class citizens—should be of the utmost concern to anyone involved in the search for lasting peace in Kalimantan. If these reports are confirmed (and are not simply the final protests of a few isolated hardliners), they spell disaster for the peace process. Local, regional and the central governments must assume their responsibilities to promote human security, equitable treatment of all citizens, and institutional recourse for all grievances.

The willingness of some local authorities and elites to bar or reject Madurese on various pretexts presents a major hurdle to pass for IDPs intent on resettling for good in Kalimantan. The local regulations implemented in Central Kalimantan have made it difficult for the Madurese IDPs to pick up where they left off in 2001. Many districts have passed laws stating that any migrant who fails to adhere to local customs is subject to expulsion. Such ambiguous regulations represent a sword of Damocles for the Madurese who will be ever vulnerable to ad hoc evaluations of behaviour that could, at a moment’s notice, trigger their expulsion. The potential for abuse is great.

The resolution of the IDP problem is also vulnerable to the actions and interests of the political elite. As the subordinates in the political structure, the IDPs lack bargaining power and are vulnerable to abuse by members of the elite. Former leaders and intellectuals of the Madurese community have been barred from returning, so the horizontal inequalities built into the alami returns are as much political as they are economic. This increases the likelihood of new conflicts, especially for a group that for decades has been a key contributor to Sampit’s (and Central Kalimantan’s) economic expansion.
In 2005, the potential for conflict in Kotawaringin Timur remains high, with or without the Madurese, due to the upcoming district elections. Five pairs of candidates (bupati and deputy bupati) are standing for the office, including the former bupati and the former deputy. Politicized ethnicity is the most pertinent issue when speaking of conflict vulnerabilities in the election process. If the Committee for Regional Elections (Komisi Pemilihan Umum Daerah/KPUD) successfully pulls off the feat of a clean and peaceful election, the next items on the agenda—the questions posed by Madurese regarding their assets and their right to employment of their choice—might find equitable and sustainable responses.

As the population of IDPs dwindles in Madura, with some villages reporting an 80 percent return rate, it is a good time to assess the experience of four years of displacement and the lessons learned. Taken under duress, the decision to evacuate 100,000 or more Madurese from Sampit and other parts of Central Kalimantan is difficult to assess, even in hindsight. There is no doubt that the decision saved numerous lives and helped put a stop to the wave of destruction sweeping the province. The four years of IDP settlement in Madura, however, raised some important issues. All that can be attempted is a look back on the period for what lessons might be gained for the future.

The settlement of IDPs in Madura faced numerous obstacles. Problems arose because the IDPs were sent to a region that had little capacity to absorb newcomers. Without industries to speak of, Madura could not hope to provide easy occupational adjustment for the displaced families. Those who had capital and could start a business found themselves in competition with locals in a limited economic environment, which led to some tensions. Those without capital found little work since the economic structure of Madurese villages makes for a very limited availability of day-wages in agriculture or in off-farm work for outsiders. Those IDPs who tried to work in the informal sector in the small towns found that money was difficult to come by and the competition stiff. Large settlements put stress on water supplies during the long dry season when wells frequently run dry, also a source of tensions in some areas. It was obvious from the beginning that most IDPs would have to depend on humanitarian assistance until their return to Kalimantan or another destination, and that permanent resettlement in Madura could never be an option for more than a few, notably those with close family ties with whom they could stay. The experience suggests that the situation might have been more favourable for these IDPs had they been settled closer to a dynamic and open economic centre rather than in poor, largely subsistence-based communities.

Difficulties arose when locals who work hard to make a living in Madura viewed the provision of humanitarian assistance for IDPs as unfair. Many locals live in poverty (particularly in Sampang, poorest of Madura's four districts), so they felt the aid programme was unfair in giving food, health facilities and financial aid only to the IDPs. The grievances were felt also because locals were aware that most IDPs came from a higher socio-economic class in Kalimantan. Village chiefs were thus given some discretion in channelling part of the aid monies to the most needy locals in their area. This could explain at least part of why so many IDPs suspected village chiefs or higher-ups were pocketing a portion of their IDP allotment.

If assistance posed a problem, its cessation in early 2004 increased the social and economic burdens on both IDPs and local communities. Tension sometimes emerged within the household as a result. The termination of aid forced IDPs to find other sources of income. This led to conflicts in the marketplace and informal sector where IDPs tried to find income.

When government aid for resettlement came online, many IDP families were spurred to return immediately to Kalimantan, so difficult was their living situation. Many who had serious reservations about returning to Kalimantan without solid guarantees of security and reintegration jumped at the opportunity, even if it meant making the
return alone. The aid distribution has gone well in some parts of Madura, but questions have been raised in others, quite naturally due to the sums involved (up to IDR 5 million, or US$ 515 per family), but also because of the particular channels of disbursement used in each district. Referring to signs that the current government in Jakarta is serious about tackling corruption, IDPs and at least one legislator in Sampang have expressed the hope that an audit would be made of the aid disbursement, if only to allay concerns.

In general, IDPs would have hoped the central government had paid more attention to their problems with aid distribution and an organized return process rather than delegating most responsibility to district and local administrations they see as uninterested in their plight. Few local NGOs exist in Madura and they must depend on available projects from national or international NGOs. One positive sign is to be found in the development of ties over time with local traditional mediation networks, such as village chiefs, informal leaders and, significantly, the ulama religious leaders. Thus, disputes between IDPs and locals could usually be settled within a local face-to-face framework. Since traditional avenues have been found to work in Madura, this provides hope that similar institutions can serve a similar role in Central Kalimantan.

More information is urgently needed on the resettlement process currently underway in Central Kalimantan. With most IDPs still in Madura receiving negative reports, it is crucial that an accurate picture of the current situation be obtained so that developments can be monitored more closely, for the benefit of IDPs first of all, but also for the donor community and the governments involved. The contours of that picture could provide an answer to the question posed rhetorically at the top of this section, on whether the decision to evacuate the IDPs to Madura was the right one to take. The answer, in turn, would have important implications for other IDPs awaiting relocation to their original place in West Kalimantan, as well as IDPs elsewhere in Indonesia.

The conflicts in Kalimantan and the displacement of vast numbers of people for many years have entailed untold personal hardships and high human and material costs. Much more reflection is needed on the modalities of rapid and effective response to future violence to prevent escalation to mass killings and ethnic cleansing, whether in Kalimantan or elsewhere in Indonesia.

6.2 Capacities for Peace

6.2.1 Security

The security approach favoured by the New Order regime had the insidious effect of causing citizens to lose faith in the values of communication and dialogue as means for solving problems. Investments need to be made to rebuild the capacity of civil society to provide for and enhance its own security. The law enforcement function of the police, for example, needs to internalize and enshrine respect for human rights. This is an urgent task for those who argue against the necessity of upgrading the military command to a district command (KODAM). For some, the recurrence of violent ethnic conflicts calls for a return to military control over law enforcement.

A permanent Interethnic Communication and Cooperation Forum needs to be created, composed of all stakeholders and meeting frequently and informally to deal proactively with incidents of cross-ethnic dispute. This forum should be provided with adequate training in early warning systems, and made aware of the need to uphold human rights and the rule of law. It would be best if clerics and leaders from all faith groups, including spiritualists, and all security forces, especially the police, be actively involved.

6.2.2 Administration

Structural problems in West and Central Kalimantan have their roots at least partly in a history of poor governance. Good governance programmes, thus, should become an integral part of peace-building programmes in this area. By good governance we mean crucial issues such as people’s participation in local decision-making, transparency, accountability and responsiveness of local government.
Good governance programmes should also be aimed at the wider society to encourage a movement for public policy advocacy. Public policies must be informed by the needs of the local people. Conflicts over natural resources can be minimized in the future if we accord more respect to local wisdom in their management instead of automatically adopting the business-first attitude.

Thus, good governance, policy advocacy, and Peace-building programmes should inform each other. This is fully in tune with the principle of Peace-building as a process of changing unfair rules into equitable practices to build justice and peace. Peace-building is also a process of forging trust and respect.

A programme of good governance should be the focus of efforts to eliminate corruption, collusion and nepotism. Financial control mechanisms created by the government are not sufficiently effective when the financial control agency is easily bribed. Members of the regional parliament (DPRD) are often tempted to join in corruption. One method that might be worth trying is the online programme of Regional Development Expenditure Budgets, where all budgets for work units in the region (such as government ministries) are published online and can be easily accessed by the broader community. Such efforts require strong policy advocacy and the support of social movements, along with the involvement of NGO networks, religious figures, intellectuals and community leaders who feel strongly about good governance.

At present, some of the displaced Madurese have settled in relocation sites and in Madura, others have returned back to their homes in Kalimantan. The lives of these people read like an uprooted tree, planted in a new ecosystem. In Kalimantan, they generally lived from agriculture. They possessed fairly large fields on which they grew rice, coconut and rubber trees, and grazed their livestock.

Conceptually, the most realistic framework for reconciliation in West and Central Kalimantan is one that creates multi-ethnic organisations to deal with questions of economy and infrastructure. These will create economic interdependence among ethnic groups. This will in turn result in close and frequent interaction and spur heart-to-heart exchanges among the ethnic groups involved. Typical approaches, acting on a more symbolic level have remained largely ceremonial and artificial. In contrast, a Credit Union functions on the infrastructural level and as such can represent one avenue to creating economic infrastructures that foster the development of inter-communal associations or crosscutting affiliations.

A credit union can play a role as an independent social group and a structure for mediation if, by its actions and services, the credit union is able to protect its individual members from the processes of political and economic marginalisation. As a result, the credit union movement fulfils a socio-political education function for all its members, enabling their voices to be better heard in the political arena and can strive to defend their economic interests. This empowerment pays dividends in the form of increased community self-esteem and heightened individual abilities to seize the initiative in improving their own welfare.

Social infrastructure was indeed one of the key issues ignored when relocation complexes were chosen for Sambas IDPs. Relocation to the relatively isolated Nyamuk Island, with very few boat connections to the mainland, resulted in the IDPs experiencing difficulties in obtaining their daily needs and in marketing their agricultural produce.

A critical issue that arises almost universally in IDP settlements is that of clean water. IDPs depend on rainwater tanks. The capacity of the average water tank owned by IDPs is insufficient for the monthly needs of a single household. Since the dry season lasts approximately two months, a clean water crisis in these IDP settlements is experienced at least once every year. Conflicts with the host community can arise when IDPs must compete with them
for scarce resources such as water, as we have seen in the case of IDPs in Madura.

6.2.5 Management of conflict over natural resources

Conflict over natural resources can be reduced if policies exist to protect the traditional controlling rights of the indigenous communities of West Kalimantan. Land communally owned by the Dayak people must be legally protected, by a Regional Regulation (Peraturan Daerah) that specifically acknowledges and regulates the Dayak community's traditional controlling rights as pertains to the communal property. The central government's Act No. 22 of 1999 recognizes the existence of traditional institutions and traditional community areas. Regulation No. 5 of 1999 of the Agricultural Ministry acknowledges the rights of traditional communities to their traditional lands. Efforts are needed to advocate this policy at the regional level to encourage the creation of a Regional Regulation acknowledging the rights of the traditional Dayak community to their traditional lands.


———. Edisi Khusus Tahun XII (Special Edition Year 12), 2003.


